Empirical studies of corporate governance in China by Cui, Li
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY
Empirical studies of corporate governance
in china
Li Cui
2014
Aston University
  
 
 Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions. 
 
If you have discovered material in AURA which is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either 
yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to 
patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please 
read our Takedown Policy and contact the service immediately 
  
1 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
 
 
 
LIMING CUI 
 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Aston University 
 
 
August 2013 
 
©  Liming Cui, 2013 asserts her moral right to be identified as the author of this thesis.  
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that any who consults it is understood to 
recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no 
information derived from it may be published without appropriate permission or 
acknowledgement. 
2 
 
 
Content 
Thesis Summary .................................................................................................................................5 
Acknowledgement..............................................................................................................................6 
Empirical Studies of Corporate Governance in China.............................................................................7 
Chapter 1 Introduction........................................................................................................................7 
1.1 Background ..................................................................................................................................7 
1.2 Contribution ...............................................................................................................................10 
1.3 Layout of following chapters. .......................................................................................................14 
Chapter 2: Event Study of Information Spillage Detection in Chinese Stock Market...............................15 
2.1 Event Study Methodology............................................................................................................16 
2.2 Conceptual Framework of Information Spillage Detection. ............................................................18 
2.3 Data Description .........................................................................................................................20 
2.4 Empirical Results .........................................................................................................................21 
2.4.1 Event Study to Test Impact of Events upon Stock Market............................................................21 
2.4.2 Detection of Information Spillage. .............................................................................................23 
2.5 Conclusion. .................................................................................................................................27 
Chapter 3 Capital Structure and Corporate Governance of Chinese Firms ............................................30 
3.1 Capital Structure and Corporate Governance ................................................................................30 
3.1.1 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem .................................................................................................30 
3.1.2. Trade-off Theory .....................................................................................................................31 
3.1.3 Information Asymmetry............................................................................................................31 
3.1.4 Corporate Control Theory .........................................................................................................32 
3.1.5 Agency Theory .........................................................................................................................33 
3.2 Characteristics of Chinese Listed Firms’ Capital Structure ..............................................................35 
3.2.1 Low Gearing Ratio ....................................................................................................................35 
3.2.2  Debt Structure.........................................................................................................................37 
3.2.3 Highly Concentrated Share Ownership Structure ........................................................................39 
3.2.4 Division of Circulating and Non-Circulating Shares ......................................................................39 
3.3 Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure upon Agency Costs.............................................................43 
3.3.1 Statistic Description of the Data Sample ....................................................................................43 
3.3.2 Research Methodology .............................................................................................................44 
3.3.3 Empirical Analysis .....................................................................................................................47 
3.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................53 
Chapter 4 2005-2006 Ownership Reform and Impact of Separated Ownership and Control on Chinese 
Firm Value........................................................................................................................................57 
4.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................57 
4.2 Chinese Stock Market 2005-2006 Ownership Reform ....................................................................60 
4.2.1Background...............................................................................................................................60 
4.2.2 Stages of the Reform ................................................................................................................62 
4.2.3 Data ........................................................................................................................................63 
4.2.4 Ownership Structure Comparison: Control Level ........................................................................65 
4.2.5 Ownership Structure Comparison: Management Involvement. ...................................................71 
3 
 
4.2.6. Ownership Structure Comparison: Pyramid Control, Crossholding and Differentiated Voting Rights.
........................................................................................................................................................72 
4.2.7 Conclusion. ..............................................................................................................................73 
4.3 Empirical Study of Separated Ownership and Control on Chinese Listed Firms ................................75 
4.3.1 Definition of Ownership, Control and Separation Ratio ...............................................................75 
4.3.2. Types of Ultimate Ownerships:.................................................................................................76 
4.3.3 Research Methodology .............................................................................................................77 
4.4 Empirical Results .........................................................................................................................79 
Chapter 5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................88 
Bibliography .....................................................................................................................................97 
 
  
4 
 
List of Table  
Table 2-1: Granger-Causality Test Result --------------------------------------------------------------------------26 
Table 3-1: Comparison of Gearing Ratio between Listed Firms and All Firms in China --------------------36 
Table 3-2: Comparison of Debt Structure between Listed Companies and the Average National Level -----
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------38 
Table 3-3 Illustration of Share Structure of All Shanghai and Shenzhen Listed Companies ----------------41 
Table 3-4 Statistical Description of Variables ---------------------------------------------------------------------45 
Table 3-5 Impact of Gearing and Shareholding Concentration Level on Agency Costs (Assets Turnover) – 
OLS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------48 
Table 3-6 Impact of Gearing and Shareholding Concentration Level on Agency Costs (ROE) –OLS-----50 
Table 3-7 Results for Equation (1) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------52 
Table 3-8 Results of Equation (2) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------53 
Table 4-1 The Ultimate Ownership of Listed Firms: Comparison Before and After Reform in 2005 -----68 
Table 4-2 The Ultimate Ownership of Listed Firms: Comparison Before and After Reform in 2006 -----69  
Table 4-3The Ultimate Ownership of Listed Firms: Overall Comparison -------------------------------------70 
Table 4-4 Year 2005 Tobin‘s Q Result -----------------------------------------------------------------------------82 
Table 4-5 Year 2006 Tobin‘s Q Result -----------------------------------------------------------------------------83 
Table 4-6 Year 2005 Annual Return Result ------------------------------------------------------------------------85 
Table 4-7 Year 2006 Annual Return Result ------------------------------------------------------------------------86 
  
5 
 
 
Thesis Summary 
 
The thesis aims to provide empirical studies towards Chinese corporate governance. Since China 
initially established its stock exchange system in the 1990s, it has gone through different stages 
of changes to become a more market-oriented system. Extensive studies have been conducted in 
Chinese corporate governance, however, many were theoretical discussion focusing on the early 
stages and there‘s a general lack of empirical analysis.  
 
This paper provides three empirical analysis of the Chinese corporate governance: the overall 
market discipline efficiency, the impact of capital structure on agency costs, the status of 2005-
2006 reform that substantially modified ownership structure of Chinese listed firms and 
separated ownership and control of listed firms.  
 
The three empirical studies were selected to reflect four key issues that need answering: the first 
empirical study, using event study to detect market discipline on a collective level. This study 
filled a gap in the Chinese stock market literature for being the first one ever using cross-market 
data to test market discipline. 
 
The second empirical study endeavoured to contribute to the existing corporate governance 
literature regarding capital structure and agency costs. Two conclusions can be made through this 
study: 1) for Chinese listed firms, higher gearing means higher asset turnover ratios and ROE, i.e. 
more debts seem to reduce agency costs; 2) concentration level of shares appears to be irrelevant 
with company performance, controlling shareholders didn‘t seem to commit to the improvement 
of corporate assets utilization or contribute to reducing agency costs. This study addressed a key 
issue in Chinese corporate governance since the state has significant shareholding in most big 
listed companies. The discussion of corporate governance in the Chinese context would be 
completely meaningless without discussing the state‘s role in corporate governance, given that 
about 2/3 of the almost all shares were non-circulating shares controlled by the state before the 
2005-2006 overhaul ownership reform. 
 
The third study focused on the 2005-2006 reform of ownership of Chinese listed firms. By 
collecting large-scale data covering all 64 groups of Chinese listed companies went through the 
reform by the end of 2006 (accounting for about 97.86% and 96.76% of the total market value of 
Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) respectively), a comprehensive study 
about the ownership reform was conducted. This would be first and most comprehensive 
empirical study in this area. The study of separated ownership and control of listed firm is the 
first study conducted using the ultimate ownership concept in Chinese context.   
 
Key Words: corporate governance, agency costs, ownership structure, capital structure, insider 
trading 
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Empirical Studies of Corporate Governance in China 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The market-oriented economic reform during the past thirty years in China has led to rapid development 
of China‘s stock market. Especially after the implementation of Company Law in July 1994 1, most of the 
medium-to-big state owned enterprises (SOE) started their process of corporatization and began to get 
listed on domestic or foreign stock market. By end of 2011, the number of companies listed on Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange reached 2,341 companies, total market value 21.5 trillion rmb, ranking the 
third globally
2. Given that China‘s GDP in 2011 is 47.16 trillion rmb, its stock market capitalization ratio 
to GDP is about 46%, almost half of its GDP; without any doubt, listed firms in China take a very 
prominent position in Chinese economy. Comparatively, according to data from the World Bank, the 
stock market capitalizations to GDP ratios of the same year for other countries are: 103.6% for U.S., 49.4% 
for U.K. 60.3% for Japan and 33.2% for Germany. 
 
                                                                 
1
 Company Law of People’s Republic of China was approved on 29
th
 December, 1993 and enforced since 1
st
 July 
1994. It has been subsequently modified in 1999, 2004 and 2005. The current Company Law was enforced since 1
st
 
June 2006 to reflect changes in Chinese economic system, namely to provide improved guid ance in corporate 
governance and protect stake holders’ interests. 
2
Data collected from the Annual Report of China Securities Regulatory Commission 2011. 
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In spite of the dramatic development of Chinese stock market in the past two decades, it is still a 
relatively new emerging market, compared to much more mature and developed worldly stock market 
such as NYSE (founded in 1817), NASDAQ ( founded in 1971; though founded relatively recently, it‘s 
an institution in a mature and developed market with almost two centuries of investment culture and 
history as well as very experienced professionals), London Stock Exchange (founded in 1801) or 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange (founded in 1602) etc.  
 
Without any doubt, Chinese stock market and corporate governance has been a focal point of study for 
many scholars and researchers, such as Tian and Estrin (2007,2008), Bai et al (2006), Nenova (2003). 
However, it is still necessary to conduct further study for the following reasons. 
 
First of all, Chinese stock market has its own distinctive characteristics that deserve more in-depth 
research. It is the writer‘s belief that Chinese listed firms distinguish themselves from the fact that the 
state has very influential impact on them. This has something to do with the listed firms‘ initial 
establishment. As a compromise between corporatization and ‗protecting‘ state assets, the shares of listed 
firms got arbitrarily divided into circulating and non-circulating shares, the latter takes about 1/3 of total 
shares. The purpose of such a distinction is to preserve state‘s control over the shares and subsequently 
the decision-making rights of the listed firms. Other than this, the state can also exert influence over the 
listed firm through state-owned banks‘ differential lending policies. Such arrangement was believed to 
have the best interest of state-owned-enterprises (SOE) at heart. However, it is arguable as to how 
beneficial it is in terms of the development of the stock market as well as economy.   One of the most 
important functions of Stock market as a financing source for companies is to raise capital from investors 
for their operational needs. It relies heavily on investors‘ confidence of the company‘s performance and 
options to improve the performance should it fail to satisfy. Such arbitrary arrangement largely restricted 
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investors‘ choices, since the tight grip of control by the state indicates it‘s extremely difficult if not 
impossible to make substantial changes, which in turn would discourage investment and damage the 
healthy development of the stock market in the long-term, leading to a stagnant stock market. It is equally 
important for the market to be a fair and open market without much foul play, another factor that might 
sabotage investors‘ confidence in the market.  Thus it is would be highly important to test the stock 
market‘s integrity so as to keep the policy makers and stakeholders informed of the status of the market 
and take necessary measures should they need to rectify the situation.   
 
Secondly, as argued above, an emerging market such as China is still going through its formative stages 
while other developed markets already had centuries of experiences of market development. There‘s room 
for improvement in terms of corporate governance.  According to the Cadbury Report
3
 (1992), corporate 
governance involves regulatory mechanisms, and the roles and relationships between a company‘s 
management, its board, shareholders and other stakeholders. It is important to have proper corporate 
governance to ensure the healthy operation of business. Failed energy giant Enron, and its bankrupt 
employees and shareholders have been a prime argument for the importance of solid corporate 
governance.  However,   the short period of Chinese stock markets‘ existence and difficulty to access data 
leads to insufficient empirical study. As a newly established market, regulations and information 
disclosure policies have only gradually come into shape: for instance, its main regulating law was only 
finalised in 2006. Given such circumstances, it is difficult to access authoritative sources of data with 
consistency and unity, making it particularly difficult to conduct empirical analysis. All the three studies 
included in this paper are empirical studies, which can make substantial contribution to the existing 
literature by using data-packed research. 
                                                                 
3
 The Cadbury Report, aka Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, is a report of a committee chaired by Adrian 
Cadbury that sets out recommendations on the arrangement of company boards and accounting systems to 
mitigate corporate governance risks and failures. The report was published in 1992. The report's recommendations 
have been adopted in varying degree by the European Union, the United States, the World Bank, and others. 
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Thirdly, the stock market itself is still going through different stages of transformation and dramatic 
changes. It is highly necessary to conduct up to date studies to reflect the latest development and 
circumstances in the market for an accurate account of the current status. The third empirical study was 
conducted targeting the most substantial stock market reform in recent years (2005-2006), using first hand 
data collected from companies' annual reports, information officially released by China Securities 
Regulation Commission and stock market information, covering a large portion of all listed firms. This 
study is the first and most comprehensive empirical study of the latest stock market reform and would 
make valuable contribution to Chinese corporate governance.  
 
For the above reasons, data-packed empirical studies will be conducted to do research on Chinese stock 
market discipline and Chinese corporate governance. In conclusion, the studies showed that there seems 
to be information spillage from one type of shares to another type, supported by the event study; the 
biggest shareholders don‘t seem to add value to the performance of listed firms, though increasing the 
level of debts plays a positive role in company performance. Finally, the 2005-2006 stock market reform, 
originally designed to dramatically reduce the state influence by allowing non-circulating shares, mostly 
controlled by the state, to circulate freely on the market, has radically changed the ownership structure, 
presenting the latest development of Chinese corporate governance status. 
 
1.2 Contribution  
 
These studies addressed different aspects of corporate governance issues in the Chinese context. They 
confirmed the emerging market status of the Chinese stock market albeit its widely acknowledged rapid 
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development over the past decades; contrary to what others might believe, the empirical study shows that 
fast development doesn‘t equate to a well regulated and fully developed mature market.  They outlined 
features and phenomenon that are unique to the Chinese market and can‘t be explained by the ‗standard‘ 
economic theories based on western mature market, such as principal-principal agency issues rather than 
principal-agent agency issue, adding to the existing literature of corporate governance study. It 
highlighted and pinpointed the overwhelmingly prevalent and strong state control even after the biggest 
ownership reform in history. Although this is not unknown to many, nobody has ever depicted the precise 
scale and scope of state control of almost the entire listed firms on Chinese stock market. The large-scale 
comprehensive data was then used to apply the ultimate ownership concept to test established western 
theories regarding separated ownership and control in the Chinese context, again showing the ‗anomaly‘ 
nature of Chinese corporate governance issue. Overall, these studies have contributed to the current 
corporate governance literature by presenting a very maverick Chinese case, each through empirical study 
and analysis. Given these singularities of the Chinese market, studies in this area would warrant more 
interesting insight and refreshing perspective to the current literature of corporate governance study.  
 
Empirical study one: Event Study of Detecting Information Spillage on Chinese Stock Market. 
The aim is to test the efficiency of Chinese market discipline by detecting the existence of information 
spillage on the stock market. Had there been no such spillage, in case of major event announcement, both 
A shares and B shares should have been traded exactly the same way. By conducting Granger-causality 
test, a causal relationship has been established between A shares and B shares, suggesting information 
was flowing from A shares to B shares and thus indicates information spillage. The study of testing the 
actual development status of Chinese stock market bears important meaning for policy makers; they could 
then address such issues accordingly targeting exposed weak area. This would be specifically discussed in 
the concluding chapter 5. 
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Empirical study two: Impact of Capital Structure on Chinese Listed Firms 
The aim of this study is to decide whether two of the most important corporate governance mechanisms, 
one internal (biggest shareholders) and one external (creditors), play any significant role in terms of 
corporate governance in China. Results show the biggest shareholders don‘t seem to contribute to 
company operation performance while debt plays a positive role in improving company value. Such 
seemingly contradictory conclusion owes very much to the unique feature of Chinese market, providing 
very valuable and important insight to the understanding of corporate governance in the Chinese context. 
 
Empirical study three: The 2005-2006 Ownership Reform and Separate Ownership and Control 
A very comprehensive sample of data targeting almost every listed company in the market were collected 
to test the scale and effect of the most substantial reform in the history of Chinese stock market. Such data 
was used to conduct empirical study regarding impact of separated ownership and control on company 
value. Results show that after the stock market reform ownership of Chinese listed firms remained status 
quo in essence, the state‘s powerful control was intact in spite of such a large scale reform. There is a 
positive relationship between concentration level of the biggest shareholder and firm performance and a 
negative relationship between the separation of control and firm performance. Again, this goes against the 
grain of economic theories based on western market, presenting very valuable and innovative insight to 
corporate governance on Chinese market, adding to existing literature.  
 
The three empirical studies were selected to reflect key issues that need answering: the first empirical 
study, using event study to detect information spillage on a collective level. This is the first study using 
cross-market data to test level of market discipline. 
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The second empirical study endeavoured to identify the important factors determining the efficiency of 
corporate governance through testing companies‘ capital structure and agency costs. Two conclusions can 
be made through this study: 1) for Chinese listed firms, higher gearing ratio means higher asset turnover 
ratios and ROE, i.e. more debts seem to boost performance/reduce agency costs; 2) concentration level of 
shares appears to be irrelevant with company‘s operational performance, controlling shareholders didn‘t 
seem to commit to the improvement of corporate assets utilization. This study addressed a key issue in 
Chinese corporate governance since the state has significant shareholding in most big listed companies. 
The discussion of corporate governance in the Chinese context would be completely meaningless without 
discussing the state‘s role in corporate governance, given that almost1/3 of all the shares were non-
circulating shares controlled by the state before the 2005-2006 overhaul ownership reform. 
 
The third study focused on the 2005-2006 reform of ownership of Chinese listed firms. By collecting 
large-scale data covering all 64 groups of Chinese listed companies went through the reform by the end of 
2006 (accounting for about 97.86% and 96.76% of the total market value of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange respectively), a comprehensive study about the ownership reform was conducted. This 
would be first and most comprehensive empirical study in this area regarding Chinese corporate 
governance. This study would subsequently be the first study ever to use the ultimate ownership concept 
to conduct empirical test of the relationship between firm performance and its biggest shareholders‘ 
concentration level; the relationship between firm performance and the separated control/cash flow. 
 
It filled the gap in Chinese stock market and corporate governance literature in the following areas: 
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Firstly, instead of general theoretical discussion alone, this thesis used a large amount of data to 
substantiate theories and hypothesis. This has added valuable empirical input to the existing literature 
regarding Chinese corporate governance. Secondly, it focused on one of the most significant reforms in 
Chinese stock market, supported by very comprehensive across the market data, sampling data of 97.86% 
and 96.76% of the total market value of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange respectively.  
 
1.3 Layout of following chapters.  
 
The chapters will be arranged as following: 
Chapter 2 include an empirical study of information spillage on Chinese stock market, using event study. 
Chapter 3 contains the empirical study of the impact of capital structure on corporate governance in China. 
The analysis suggests the biggest shareholders don‘t seem to add value to company operational efficiency; 
while company debts seem to have stronger motivational power to boost company performance. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the 2005-2006 stock market reform in China and uses post-reform data to test 
impact of separate ownership and control on company value.  
Chapter 5 Concludes.  
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Chapter 2: Event Study of Information Spillage Detection in Chinese 
Stock Market 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Chinese stock market has only been established in the 1990s and is one of the 
emerging markets. This means it is still in the process of formulating rules and making improvement 
along the way. This chapter focuses on testing Chinese stock market using event study to decide whether 
there‘s information spillage.  
 
One of the most important functions of Stock market as a financing source for companies is to raise 
capital from investors for their operational needs. It relies heavily on investors‘ confidence of the 
company‘s performance and options to improve the performance should it fail to satisfy. It is equally 
important for the market to be a fair and open market, another factor that might sabotage investors‘ 
confidence in the market.  Thus it is would be highly important to test the stock market‘s integrity so as to 
keep the policy makers and stakeholders informed of the status of the market and take necessary measures 
should they need to rectify the situation.   
 
The "Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation" published by the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 1998 and updated in 2003 states that the three objectives of good 
securities market regulation are:  
1. Investor protection, 
2. Insuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and 
3. Reducing systemic risk. 
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The importance of a fair, efficient and transparent market has been emphasized; phenomenon such as 
information spillage on a stock market would jeopardize the principle of fairness and create an unfair 
advantage to those who are privy to earlier access of information. Thus it is important to detect and take 
measures to eradicate such practice. 
 
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund now use the IOSCO Core Principles in reviewing the 
financial health of different country's regulatory systems as part of these organizations‘ financial sector 
assessment program. 
  
Event study was used to observe the market reaction towards company news announcements and see 
whether part of the market appears to know that information beforehand. If the possibility of ‗information 
spillage‘ before the news announcement gets ruled out, it means good market  practices are in place and 
vice versa. 
 
2.1 Event Study Methodology 
 
In a nutshell, event study refers to studies using the occurrence of significant news (the event) as a 
benchmark to compare the before and after situations. 
 
As summarized by Macinlay (1997), event study has a long history. James Dolley (1933) is one of the 
first to use it analyzing normal price changes at the time of the stock splits. It is the seminal work of 
Eugene Fama (1969) that introduced the methodology essentially used today. Fama et al. studied the 
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effects of stock splits after removing the effects of simultaneous dividend increases. In years to come, 
there have been modifications to the existing method. They relate to the complications arising from 
violations of statistical assumptions used in the early work and related to adjustments in the design to 
accommodate more specific hypothesis.  
 
Event studies are used to measure the impact of an economic event on firm value. Assuming that the 
event will be reflected in traded share prices, these studies focus on how share prices respond to 
information released during a public announcement of the event (Battacharya et al 2000).  
 
Chinese companies issue many different kinds of equity. For the purpose of this study, two types of 
shares interest us, the A-shares and B-shares. A shares may only be held by Chinese citizens and B shares 
may only be held by foreign investors or Chinese citizens residing abroad. It is this unique arrangement of 
A shares and B shares that enable us to conduct the granger-causality test to determine the direction of 
information leak, as discussed in details in section 3.5.2 A  
 
In the specific case of our research, ‗event‘ would be company performance related news, such as mergers 
and acquisitions, spin-offs, sell-off, etc. the kind of news that are significant enough to motivate investors 
to react accordingly such as buying or selling shares. Events could be used as a form of benchmark to 
determine the existence of changes before and after the occurrence of events.  
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2.2 Conceptual Framework of Information Spillage Detection. 
 
Bhattacharya et al (2000) gives out their framework of the detection of information spillage. In a stock 
market where the stock prices do not seem to react to firm-specific news, several scenarios may possibly 
lead to such phenomenon: 
 
(1).The stock market is inefficient. This implies that stock prices are not linked to firm values and stock 
prices don‘t catch new information about firm value released through corporate announcements. This is 
not true for Chinese stock market. Research conducted by Liu et al (1997) and Lawrence et al (1997) have 
shown that the two stock markets (Shanghai Stock Market and Shenzhen Stock Market)  of China 
displayed weak-form efficiency. Therefore, this is not a viable explanation for lack of reaction to news-
worthy events. 
(2).The sample size is too small to pick up the market reaction towards company news. Similarly this can 
be disabused due to the reaction from stock market to big events. The same applies to the following 
scenario (3). 
(3).There is no value-relevant new announcements. In this case, even if the stock market is efficient, 
prices have no announcement against which to respond to.  
(4).The stock market is efficient and corporations do produce value-relevant news, the news may be 
completely anticipated. In such a market, the news brings no surprises and thus the prices wouldn‘t show 
any reaction. If this were the case, both A shares and B shares on Chinese stock markets would have 
displayed the same reaction: those events are either perceived as surprises on both markets or treated as 
not worthy of action  on both markets. Should there be different reactions from A shares and B shares, 
this possibility would be ruled out.  
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(5). Mechanism prohibiting information spillages doesn‘t exist in the stock market, or, if it does, it is not 
enforced efficiently. After eliminating all above four possibilities, this would seem the only logical 
explanation. 
 
From the above analysis of the specific case of Chinese stock markets, scenario (1) can be ruled out 
without much further ado, given that Chinese stock market has been found weak-form efficient by prior 
research. Scenarios (2) and (3) can also be invalidated, provided the sample size is sufficiently big enough 
to display reaction to event, and the events are material enough to motivate reaction. Following the above 
analysis, naturally hypothesis 1 would be to determine whether the stock markets react to news-worthy 
event. By establishing the mere presence of reaction, scenarios (2) and (3) can be immediately ruled out. 
 
What remains to be seen is whether the A shares and B shares on the market would respond to significant 
corporate events, and whether they would both display reaction or lack of reaction to determine if 
scenario (4) or scenario (5) is valid. . Thus hypothesis (2) would be to determine if information spillage is 
the only remaining viable option. 
 
Summarising the above discussions, the two hypotheses would be: 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese stock market doesn‘t respond to significant corporate event. 
Hypothesis 2: There‘s information spillage between A shares and B shares. 
 
In order to test hypothesis 1 and 2, two sets of tests were conducted. In the first test, event study was 
conducted to determine whether significant corporate news has impact upon market through statistical 
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model, testing A shares and B shares respectively. The choice of using this method, the event study, is 
practically by default: the direct approach of using interviews or questionnaires asking for voluntary 
disclosure of information spillage on a case by case level is out of the question, leaving the indirect 
approach, using event study to see how the overall market reacts, the only viable option. 
  
Then a second test, granger-causality test, would be conducted to determine the direction of information 
leak. Granger-causality tests are used to determine the lead-lag relationship between two parties. That is, 
without presuming the direction of which party is the lead (the reason that lead to the results), and which 
one is the lag (the results thus followed the previous reason), Granger-causality test can establish such 
direction. In this particular case, after using event study with both A shares and B shares to see their 
reaction or lack of reaction to news-worthy event, Granger-causality test will be conducted to determine if 
there‘s a lead-lag relationship between A shares and B shares. Confirmation of such lead-lag relationship 
will be evidence to hypothesis 2: there‘s information spillage between A shares and B shares.  
 
2.3 Data Description 
 
The sample data was selected randomly among all the listed companies that have firm specific news 
announcement from January1997 to December 2000.  Events happened in the four-year period between 
1997 and 2000 are included. Altogether 138 shares were selected, including 84 A shares and 51 B shares, 
including both shares from Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Company events 
include news about merger and acquisition, change of board, sell-off, spin-off, take-over and joint venture. 
A wide range of news announcement has been selected to include more data in the sample. The news 
announcements were from the website of China Security Regulatory Committee and all other data are 
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from TsingHua University data collection. An event period is defined as 80 days before the news 
announcement to 10 days after the news announcement. For each of these event periods, for both A shares 
and B shares, we obtained the daily closing transaction price and the daily trading volumes for 90 days. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
 
2.4.1 Event Study to Test Impact of Events upon Stock Market  
 
The abnormal returns for each firm every day in the event period was tested, using the methodology by 
Brown and Warner (1985) and Bhattacharya et al (2000) and MacKinlay (1997).  The constant expected 
return model:  Rit = ui+eit   ,Where Rit is the return for stock i over time period t, ui is the expected return 
for stock i and eit is the usual statistical error term. 
 
The constant expected return model, one of the statistic models, has been chosen to define excess returns 
for each firm for each day. Brown and Warner (1985) find this model often yield similar results to other 
models like the Market Model. MacKinlay (1997) attributes the lack of model sensitivity to the fact that 
the variances of the abnormal returns are frequently not reduced much by choosing a different model. For 
this study only the constant expected return model was used for analysis, though other models should 
produce similar results.  
 
The normal period is defined as 80 days before the announcement day to 10 days before the 
announcement day. This time period was used to define the expected return: ARit=Rit. With a reasonably 
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large length of the normal period, we can estimate the variance of security i:  2
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,Using these estimates, the abnormal returns for each event period can be obtained. 
The concept of a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is necessary to accommodate a multiple period event 
window. We will first consider aggregation through time for an individual security and then will consider 
aggregation both across securities and through time. We define CAR as:
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22 CARi   13 is the length of the period of the event window, 10 days before 
the news announcement to two days after the event day. The average abnormal returns can then be 
aggregated over the event window:
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event has no impact on the behavior of the returns (mean or variance). It can be tested using
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N(0,1) A t-statistic is estimated for each firm during the event window. Our null hypothesis is that excess 
returns for the event day is equal to zero. We use a t-distribution to decide on the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, relying on a two-tailed t-test at a 5% significance level.  As can be seen from the figure, on 
the event day (day 0) the sample average cumulative abnormal return for A shares is 0.01542, and the 
standard deviation is 0.59243, thus the I  is 0.02603 and the null hypothesis that the event has no impact 
can‘t be rejected. However, the story is different for the B shares. The average cumulative abnormal 
return for B shares is 1.27173 and its standard deviation is 0.53772, the value of I  for B shares is 
2.36515 and the null hypothesis that the event has no impact can be rejected at 5% significance level. We 
change the length of the event window and our conclusion remains the same. 
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2.4.2 Detection of Information Spillage. 
 
A. Theoretical Framework 
 
This study has followed the tests set out in Battacharya et al (2000) to detect the information spillage in a 
stock market. One of the reasons they listed about using this method, the event study, is by default: since 
there‘s hardly ever any volunteer disclosure of those who involved in information spillage, a case by case 
study is almost impossible. The alternative seems to be testing the overall market instead of individual 
cases, which would be a futile effort to convince people to incriminate themselves in absence of pangs of 
conscience. Since this direct approach is not viable in reality, the indirect approach, using event study to 
see how the overall market reacts, appears to be the only viable option left. 
 
As discussed earlier, five possible reasons can attribute to the non-response of stock prices (Bhattacharya 
et al, 2000): inefficient market; small sample size; efficient market but the news is not value relevant; the 
news fully anticipated by external investors; information spillage has led to full incorporation of the news 
before its official release. 
 
For the five scenarios, if any of the first three were true, there would be no price behavior that suggests an 
information spillage. However, if any of the last two hypotheses were true, there should be price behavior 
suggesting information spillage. If the public has fully anticipated the news announcement either through 
their diligent study of the stock market or through leakage, they would invest accordingly and the stock 
prices would have reflected the news announcement before its public announcement. This way there 
should be no surprise to the public investors and stock prices wouldn‘t be influenced. On the other hand, 
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widespread information spillage would lead to the almost full incorporation of the news into the stock 
prices and the stock prices would reflect such an information spillage. Again, the news announcement 
wouldn‘t appear as a surprise to the market.  
 
The segmentation of A shares and B shares in Chinese stock market has made it possible to discern the 
five cases and identify the only cause. For the full anticipation case, the two types of shares should 
display same time series patterns. If the information spillage case is true, their price behavior might be 
different. The difference in the price behavior of A shares and B shares serves a two-fold purpose. Firstly, 
it reveals a significant spillover effect from one share to the other. This would provide evidence against 
the first four scenarios, small sample size, inefficient market, value-irrelevant news announcement and 
full anticipation. Secondly, it indicates the direction of information leakage. The information would flow 
from the share that has earlier access to information to the one that information spillage is less prevalent. 
 
B. Granger Causality Test. 
 
Granger-Causality test would be conducted to determine the lead-lag relationship between A shares and B 
shares. Since the exact direction of the information flow is uncertain, they will be treated equally without 
pre-assuming the direction of information leakage. Granger causality test is designed to establish the 
causal relationship between two variables. If the lags of variable x have explanatory power to variable y, 
but the opposite is not true, we can say that variable x granger causes variable y, x is the cause and y is 
the effect. 
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Among the sample of firms selected, only the firms issuing both A shares and B shares will be chose for 
this test, due to our purpose of studying the direction of information flow between A shares and B shares. 
 
The data of variance of returns will be used to decide such a relationship. The reason of using variance of 
returns instead of the absolute residual value of returns is that any news influencing the redistribution of 
returns between A shares and B shares would be taken as good news for one group of investors and bad 
news for the other group of investors. There are events like this in the sample as well as events that both 
groups of investors would deem as good news or bad news (e.g. higher earnings news might be perceived 
as good news by both groups). Their total effect might be obscure if the absolute value of the returns is 
used. For instance, an increase in the price of A shares could be followed either by an increase in B shares, 
due to the added value of the firm, or could be followed by an decrease in B shares because of 
redistribution, firms with these two different kind of cases might cancel each other out, make it possible 
to detect any causality effect, while it actually does exist. 
 
In order to determine whether the information from A shares lead to B shares, or vice versa, firstly, the 
optimal lag lengths need to be decided. For this purpose, the Akaik (AIC) and the Schwarz (SBS) criteria 
select the orders of 2. The adjusted log-likelihood ratio statistics (adjusted for small samples) do not reject 
a VAR of order 2. In the light of these the VAR (2) model was selected. This means the 2 lag lenths are 
selected to test the direction of information spillage. The Granger-causality test here is a F-test, and the 
null hypotheses are as following: 
Hypothesis 1:  B shares do not granger cause A shares. 
Hypothesis 2: A shares do not granger cause B shares. 
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Table 2-1: Granger-Causality Test Result 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability 
  B does not Granger Cause A   1.29275  0.27992 
  A does not Granger Cause B  24.8262  3.4E-09*** 
 
The above table shows the testing results of the null hypothesis to determine whether there is information 
flow between A shares and B shares and what is the direction of information flow if this is the case.  From 
the results, the F value for the hypothesis that variance of B doesn‘t cause the variance in A shares is 
1.29275 at the probability of 27.992% which is not a significant enough value to reject the hypothesis, 
therefore the hypothesis is true that variances of B doesn‘t cause variances in A shares.  
 
However, for the following hypothesis that variance of A shares doesn‘t granger cause variances of B 
shares, the F value is 24.8262, significant at better than 1% which means the hypothesis can be 
confidently rejected therefore the opposite statement should be true: variances in A shares does granger 
cause variances in B shares, indicating an information flow from A shares to B shares.  
 
The previous tests have rejected the first three hypothesis of small sample, inefficient market and no 
news-worthy event, since if any of these three scenarios were true, then the cumulative absolute return 
would have been zero for both A shares and B shares, however, the previous test significantly rejected the 
hypothesis 1 that Chinese stock market doesn‘t respond to events, since these events came as a surprise to 
B shares and they showed responses to such events. 
 
Only two scenarios are left: investors fully anticipated such event and existence of information spillage. If 
the investors have fully anticipated these events and already incorporated the impact of the events into the 
stock prices, then both A shares and B shares should have exhibited same patterns of reaction. However, 
27 
 
this is not the case. Only A shares showed no reaction to such events, which appear to be a surprise to B 
shares. Additionally, the granger causality tests formally confirmed the information flowed the d irection 
of information flow is from A shares to B shares, supporting information leakage scenario instead of the 
market anticipation theory.  
 
2.5 Conclusion. 
 
In this chapter, two empirical tests were conducted to detect the existence of information spillage.  
 
The first test recorded the different reaction of market towards announcement of company related news: 
A shares don‘t seem to have much reaction, while B shares do show some signs of reaction.  When some 
material events are announced, it is expected that the market would have some reaction accordingly, for 
instance: an announcement for profit increases would lead to increase in the value of a firm‘s share price; 
while an announcement of losses would cause a drop in the firm‘s share price. A lack of reaction in face 
of material news event would be abnormal and unusual. The possibilities for such a lack of reaction could 
be explained by the following scenarios:  
(1). Inefficient market: market efficiency theory suggests that there are three forms of market efficiency, 
the weak form, the semi-strong form and the strong form efficiency. The weak form efficiency stipulates 
that stock prices reflect all past information; the semi-strong form efficiency means that stock prices 
reflect all past and current publicly available information; the strong-form efficiency indicates the stock 
prices have incorporate all information, past and present, publicly available or insider information etc. It 
is generally accepted that the stock markets in the world are mostly either weak-form efficiency or 
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leaning towards semi-strong efficiency and hardly any is strong-form efficiency. Chinese stock markets 
have been found as weak-form efficient by Liu et al (1997) and Laurence et al (1997).   
(2). Small sample size. 
(3). The news is not value relevant. The above two reasons can be ruled out since if any of these were true, 
both A shares and B shares wouldn‘t have demonstrated any reaction to news-worthy events at all.  
(4). The news fully anticipated by external investors. This can‘t be the case since otherwise A shares and 
B shares would have both reacted or not reacted to the event. 
(5).Information spillage has led to full incorporation of the news before its official release. This seems 
like the only option left after all the other scenarios got eliminated. The second set of test decides the 
lead-lag relationship between A shares and B shares. The return of one type of shares, A shares, 
unambiguously leads the return of another type of shares, B shares, before public news announcement. 
Suggesting there is an information spillover from one share type to the other. The observed lead-lag 
relationship between A shares and B shares in the pre-announcement period reveals that information is 
being gradually incorporated first into the prices of A shares and then into the prices of B shares.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese stock market doesn‘t respond to significant corporate event.  Hypothesis 1 is not 
true, since there has been reaction from the B share market, as discussed in section 2.5.1.  
Hypothesis 2: There‘s information spillage between A shares and B shares. Combining with granger 
causality test result, the lack of reaction from A share market cannot rule out the possibility information 
spillage, hypothesis 2 can‘t be rejected. 
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It wouldn‘t be possible to detect this pattern if the market is inefficient, or the news announcements are 
value-irrelevant, or the power of the tests is small because of a small sample size. This is because under 
any of these three assumptions there would be no linkage between prices and information, before or after 
the news announcements. The scenario that the public had fully anticipated the news prior to news 
announcement can be excluded, because then both A shares and B shares would have the same pre-
announcement price behavior. The fact that the prices of A shares lead the prices of B shares hints that 
information spillage would be responsible for the lack of response in stock prices to corporate news 
announcements. (Bhattacharya et al, 2000).  One of the possibilities is that the public get their information 
from observing the behavior of others, for instance, they might be following the investment savants‘ 
action and copy whatever they were doing. Thus the information would be absorbed and incorporate in 
the share prices in a much faster pace, looking as if there‘s not much shock to the recently announced 
news. Another piece of evidence is that although both types of shares show little reaction, the reaction 
from A shares are even less than those from B shares. So holders of the A shares are less surprised by the 
holders of B shares. This might not be mere coincidence, considering A shares are traded by domestic 
investors who are privy to the grapevine gossip while B shares are traded by foreign investors who are 
playing on guest-field and don‘t enjoy the same advantage of being close to the source of information.  
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Chapter 3 Capital Structure and Corporate Governance of Chinese Firms 
  
3.1 Capital Structure and Corporate Governance 
 
Capital structure refers to the way a corporation finances its assets through some combination of equity 
and debt. Capital structure theories focus on whether there is in fact an optimal capital structure that can 
maximize the value of the firm.  
 
3.1.1 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem, proposed by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958, forms the 
basis for modern thinking on capital structure, though it is generally viewed as a purely theoretical result 
since it disregards many important factors in the capital structure decision. The theorem states that, in a 
perfect market, how a firm is financed is irrelevant to its value. This result provides the base with which 
to examine real world reasons why capital structure is relevant, that is, a company's value is affected by 
the capital structure it employs. The real world reasons include bankruptcy costs, agency costs, taxes, and 
information asymmetry.  
 
In 1963, their analysis was extended to include the effect of taxes and risky debt. Under a classical tax 
system, the tax deductibility of interest makes debt financing valuable; that is, the cost of capital 
decreases as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases. The optimal structure then would be 
to have virtually no equity at all.  
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3.1.2. Trade-off Theory 
 
Trade-off theory allows the bankruptcy cost to exist. It states that there is an advantage to financing with 
debt (the tax benefits of debt) and that there is a cost of financing with debt (the bankruptcy costs and the 
financial distress costs of debt). The marginal benefit of further increases in debt declines as debt 
increases, while the marginal cost increases, so that a firm that is optimizing its overall value will focus 
on this trade-off when choosing how much debt and equity to use for financing. Advocates of trade-off 
theory include Scott (1976) and Robicheck & Myers (1966)  
 
3.1.3 Information Asymmetry  
 
(1) Signal Function of Capital Structure  
 
Corporate managers have access to inside information of a firm‘s future profits and risks while external 
investors don‘t, however, they have an understanding of the ‗signal‘ sent out through managers‘ financing 
choice (Ross, 1977). More debt would be construed as a positive signal indicating managers‘ confidence 
in profitable return (equity would mean issuing shares which meant 'bringing external ownership' into the 
company). The associated risk of potential bankruptcy makes higher debt ratio a more reliable indicator of 
managers‘ optimism.  
 
Alternatively, information asymmetry means investors can read into the profitability prospects of a 
company through proposition of debt financing and shareholding by managers (Leland and Pyle 1977). 
Higher debt ratio and managerial shareholding send out positive signals of the company‘s future 
profitability.  
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(2) Pecking Order Theory 
 
Pecking Order theory tries to capture the costs of asymmetric information. It states that companies 
prioritize their sources of financing according to the law of least effort, or of least resistance, preferring to 
raise equity as a financing means of last resort. Hence: internal financing is used first; when that is 
depleted, then debt is issued; and when it is no longer sensible to issue any more debt, equity is issued. 
This theory maintains that businesses adhere to a hierarchy of financing sources and prefer internal 
financing when available, and debt is preferred over equity if external financing is required. Thus, the 
form of debt a firm chooses can act as a signal of its need for external finance. The pecking order theory 
is popularized by Myers (1984) when he argues that equity is a less preferred means to raise capital 
because when managers (who are assumed to know better about true condition of the firm than investors) 
issue new equity, investors believe that managers think that the firm is overvalued and managers are 
taking advantage of this over-valuation. As a result, investors will place a lower value to the new equity 
issuance. 
 
3.1.4 Corporate Control Theory 
 
Corporate control theory states that managers‘ choice of financing would be motivated by their efforts to 
maintain their control of the company. They would prefer internal financing and debt financing over 
equity. Internal financing won‘t have any impact on existing control rights. Although debt imposes stress 
of payment of principal and interest, managers would remain in control till actual default. Equity would 
introduce more shareholders into the firm and dilute the managers‘ control power (Harris and Raviv, 1988; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1992). This theory echoed with the pecking order theory in stating the preference of 
managers financing choice of internal financing, debt and equity. The change of company capital 
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structure would lead to the alteration of management shareholding proportion, and thus influence the 
competition result for company control (Stulz, 1988).  
 
3.1.5 Agency Theory 
 
Under the circumstances of management possessing less than 100% residual cash flow rights, potential 
interest conflicts between management (the agent) and shareholders (the principal) may arise (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
This is also called the principal–agent problem. It concerns the difficulties in motivating the agent to act 
on behalf of the principal. The two parties have different interests and asymmetric information (the agent 
having more information), such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the agents are always acting 
in the principals' best interests, particularly when activities that are useful to the principal are costly to the 
agent, and where elements of what the agent does are costly for the principal to observe. Moral hazard 
and conflict of interest may arise. The deviation from the principal's interest by the agent is called 'agency 
costs.' The key issue regarding agency theory is how to minimize agency costs, i.e. motivate managers 
and align the interest of agents with principals.  
 
The relevance of agency costs and capital structure can be explained in three ways: 
 
(1). Assets substitution effect: as debt increases, management has an increased incentive to undertake 
risky even negative NPV projects. This is because if the project is successful, shareholders get all the 
upside, whereas if it is unsuccessful, debt holders get all the downside. If the projects are undertaken, 
there is a chance of firm value decreasing and wealth transfer from debt holders to shareholders. 
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(2). Underinvestment problem: if debt is risky, the gain from the project will accrue to debt holders rather 
than shareholders. Thus, management has an incentive to reject positive NPV projects, even though they 
have the potential to increase firm value (Myers, 1977).  
 
(3). Free cash flow: Michael Jensen (1986) defined free cash flow as the residual cash flow of a company 
after meeting all capital expenditure requirements of projects with a positive NPV. This is the maximum 
amount of cash dispensable without disrupting the continuous development of a company. Unless free 
cash is given back to investors, management has an incentive to destroy firm value through empire 
building and perks etc. Higher debt imposes financial discipline on management (Grossman & Hart, 
1982). 
 
As discussed above, there are competing theories either advocating the benefit of debt financing (M&M 
theory, corporate control theory) or equity financing (signal function of financing choice, pecking order 
theory) regarding what‘s the best practice of financing choice in terms of corporate performance.  
Principal-agent conflict was created due to the separation of ownership and management of modern 
enterprises. Agency costs measure the damage suffered as a result of such conflict, leading to reduced 
corporate performance if not managed properly. Similarly, disputes regarding debt‘s role in reducing 
agency costs and boost company performance follow suit. Some argue for debt‘s value damaging role due 
to asset substitution and under-investment, some believe debt would reduce free cash flow available to 
manager and reduce agency costs. All these discussions were based on the western context of developed 
and mature market. Thus it would be necessary to conduct research about Chinese firms and provide 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between raising debt and firm performance.  
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International research has been focusing on resolving the conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and management. However, due to the special 
features of Chinese stock market, agency problems are not limited to the conflict between agent and 
principal, but also include that between big shareholders and small shareholders. This study is concerned 
with the agency problem between big shareholders (state-owned shares) and small shareholders 
(circulating shares) in Chinese listed companies‘ ownership structure. Studies of Chinese scholars were 
about the impact of refinancing structure on corporate governance or vice versa, there hasn‘t been any 
study addressing their impact on each other except for Yan (2001), though he didn‘t perform any 
empirical study.  
 
3.2 Characteristics of Chinese Listed Firms’ Capital Structure  
 
3.2.1 Low Gearing Ratio 
 
Chinese listed firms have relatively (compare to other Chinese firms) low gearing ratios. This can be 
demonstrated from Table 3-1. From 1998-2001, the average gearing ratio (debt divided by sum of debt 
and equity) of listed firms are all lower than the national average by about 10%. 
 
           Table 3-1 Comparison of Gearing Ratio between Listed Firms and All Firms in China 
         Data sources: Donghui Shi, Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies‘ Capital Structure and Financing behaviours．    
         www.studa.com/newpaper/2003-10-31/ 
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There are several reasons for the comparatively low gearing ratio of Chinese listed firms. 
 
(1) Institutional Requirements  
CSRC required that companies seeking to get listed should have lower than 70% gearing ratio. Listed 
firms normally manage to reduce their debt level before IPO; after the IPO, capital obtained through 
equity market would further reduce their debt. The easy access to money once a firm got listed is a strong 
motivation for low gearing. For instance, Sanyi Heavy Industrial Co. Ltd obtained 900 million rmb from 
the stock market since its listing in July 2003. Right before its listing, its gearing ratio has reduced 
dramatically from 72.5% (2000), 61.52% (2001) and 58.84% (2002). However, not all listed firms have 
low gearing. Some firms would have to increase their debts after IPO either because of bad management 
or their return on equity (ROEs) ratio doesn‘t meet requirements of right share issuance. For instance, 
according to www.stock.hexun.com, by the end of 2011, the 10 companies with the highest gearing ratios 
range from 292.28% to as much as 1339.69%. This means these companies don‘t have enough assets to 
cover their debts.  
 
(2). Preference to Equity 
Listed firms with comparatively good performance (in terms of ROE) are more willing to finance with 
equity and generally have lower debt ratio. The cost of obtaining capital through equity is relatively low 
in China due to investors‘ lack of experience and insufficient legislation. Firms are very keen to ‗grab 
money‘ on the stock market, since dividend payment is not compulsory.  Some of the reasons are listed 
below: 
(1) Since its nascent stage, the Chinese Stock Market was set up mainly to provide financing resources to 
state owned enterprises; relevant regulations and policies were designed to favor the big institutions and 
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enterprises to small investors. Consequently, minority investors were left vulnerable and find it difficult 
to exert influence over listed firms. 
(2) Lack of stringent IPO approval process for listed companies. Instead of the normal IPO approval 
process for listed companies on developed markets, where the companies have to go through strict and 
professional procedures to impress potential investors with their performances and financial statements, 
IPO for Chinese companies on the stock markets were actually ‗authorized‘ by government until 2005. It 
is not unusual to see companies trump up their financial statements to get listed in order to access capital. 
Minority investors lack the necessary information and expertise to discern committed ones from the ones 
only intend to grab money. Similarly, the right issue was also ‗authorized‘ instead of approved through 
stringent procedures, investors who refuse to participate would risk having their shares diluted or losing 
out. 
(3). Lack of sufficient regulations. For instance, initially there was no regulation stipulating specific use 
of the capital raised. Listed companies could take advantage and abuse this by using the capital in 
whatever ways they may please without supervision or accountability. They would perceive the stock 
market as a goldmine to get money, since there‘s no compulsory repayment of the investment and 
dividend payments are at the discretion of the company.  
 
3.2.2 Debt Structure 
 
Debt structure refers to the variety and proportion of different debts, which includes short-term debt. 
Short-term debt is the most common form of borrowing, also the riskiest one. A firm‘s current debt level 
would influence the corporate value.  
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Table 3-2 shows that short-term debts of listed firms takes more than 78% of their total debts, 12% higher 
than that of the national average level.  (The short-term debts and total debts here refer to bank loans only, 
not including working capital or trade credit etc). However, when compared to developed markets such as 
the U.S., the short term debts for Chinese listed firms are comparatively modest: short term debts for U.S. 
companies from 1914 to 2011 averaged about 66% of GDP, while it peaked in 2007 to 99% right before 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008. (Short Term Debts and Financial Crisis: what we can learn from 
the U.S. treasury supply. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, May 2013). It is believed that the 
relatively low level of short term debt on emerging markets comparing to the developed markets is due to 
the tighter bank regulation in emerging markets. 
 
Table 3-2 Comparison of Debt Structure between Listed Companies and the Average National Level   
Data sources: Donghui Shi, Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies‘ Capital Structure and Financing 
Behaviours． www.studa.com/newpaper/2003-10-31/ 
 
The sources of debts for Chinese listed firms are mainly bank loans. Restrictions from the government as 
well as the finance system caused the bond market lag behind the stock market in supplying capital. A 
well-established capital market would have balanced equity market and debt market. Take U.S. for 
example, 1200 companies issued corporate bonds in 2001 and only 200 companies got listed during the 
same year. The amount of money injected in the firms from corporate bonds is about 30% and only less 
than 4% is from stock market. The situation in bond market is quite different in China. Out of more than 
1200 listed firms in China, less than 20 of them issued bonds, only 1.56% of all the companies. The weak 
financing capability of corporate bond restricted the further development of Chinese financial market. 
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3.2.3 Highly Concentrated Share Ownership Structure  
 
One of the very outstanding characteristics of Chinese large to medium enterprises is the large number of 
state owned or state controlled firms. Some listed firms still have one predominant controlling 
shareholder. Most of Chinese listed firms are transformed from former SOEs and the percentage of state 
shares is extremely high. By 2002, 890 out of 1124 listed companies‘ biggest shareholders have more 
than 50% of the company shares, 63 of them (5.62%) have shareholders controlling over 75% of total 
shares, mostly state and corporate shareholders. Such prevalent and predominant control possessed by the 
state indicates the relatively weak and vulnerable position of the minority shareholders, leading to the 
potential conflict between big and small shareholders discussed in the introduction section of this chapter. 
 
3.2.4 Division of Circulating and Non-Circulating Shares 
 
Chinese stock markets include circulating and non-circulating shares. About two thirds of the total shares 
are not allowed to circulate (see table 3-3). The state shares are not transferable as other public shares, and 
corporation shares are only allowed to circulate among corporation shareholders.  
        
The circulating shares of Chinese listed firms are about 35% of the total shares and the government has 
absolute control over them. Such shareholding structure has substantial implications regarding corporate 
governance of listed firms. One of the implications is the agency problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
predicted that, the higher the shareholding of management, the lower the agency costs. Theoretically, 
since the state holds the majority of shares, when the state manages the listed firms, agency costs should 
be comparatively low. However, the state can only run the firms through state nominated managers who 
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are government officials and don‘t respond to the usual governance mechanisms such as monetary reward 
or loss of position. This is because their salary and position in the government is fixed and won‘t change 
with company performance. With only one third shares, it‘s practically impossible to remove a manager 
with poor performance since the state‘s majority shareholding means it has the final say. The normal 
corporate governance mechanisms in the western equity market have very limited or virtually no power 
over managers in Chinese listed firms. It‘s easy for managers to abuse their inside information; agency 
costs would be exceptionally high.   
Such principal-principal agency issue was also discussed by Hoskisson et al (2009). Their research 
focused on two potentially conflicting owners on the emerging market of South Korea: foreign 
institutional owners and family owners. Due to weak legal protection to foreign investors in East Asia, 
powerful family owners can often expropriate wealth from outside investors by diverting company 
resources for family‘s private wealth. As a result, outside investors are often concerned with agency 
problems engendered by dominant family owners. 
A similar but different form of principal-principal agency issue was discovered in context of privatization 
in Eastern and Central Europe. In the process of privatization, management and workers might take 
advantage of the muddled redefinition of residual income and enrich their own interest at the cost of the 
state (Lipton & Sachs, 1990). Listed firms‘ share structure is shown in Table 3-3.  
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Table 3-3 Illustration of Share Structure of All Shanghai and Shenzhen Listed Companies 
        Data resources：CSRC Chinese Securities and Futures Statistical Year Book（2003）  
From the above table, the number of circulating shares is about 1/3 of total shares for all four years from 
1998 to 2002 and the numbers of state shares are all higher than total circulating shares for all four years. 
Put it in another way: even if a certain company/institution/individual gets all the circulating shares on the 
market, the state would still be in absolute control, there is not the slightest chance for the market to 
decide freely. The state as the majority shareholder could easily hijack the will of the minority 
shareholders to the extent of harming minority shareholders‘ interest. Therefore, the principal-agent 
conflict under agency theory transforms into the majority-minority shareholder conflict under the Chinese 
context.  
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The division of circulating and non-circulating shares and state being the majority shareholder indicate 
compromised external corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese listed firms. 
(1). The main channel to transfer corporate control is through negotiated transfer agreement of non-
circulating shares, which deteriorated the unbalanced position of majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders, reinforcing majority shareholders‘ control.  
(2) The governance mechanism of creditors won‘t function well. Government institutions as companies‘ 
majority shareholders instead of creditors normally lead the bankruptcy clearance. The constraint from 
creditors can‘t make much real impact.  
(3). The majority of shares are not allowed to circulate and there‘s always one dominating shareholder of 
each firm, minority shareholders can‘t exert their influence over the management and operation of listed 
firms.  
  
All the features mentioned above regarding Chinese listed firms, can be summarized as following: 
relatively low gearing ratio; lower proportion of short-term loans comparing to the developed markets 
such as the U.S., strong state ownership and arbitrarily divided circulating and non-circulating shares.  
.  
Each and every one of these features is distinctively different from the ‗standard‘ features of the more 
mature and developed markets:  they are very much the stark opposite of the ‗norms‘ of developed 
markets that are the subject of prevalent research. Apply the tried and tested capital structure and agency 
theory formulated mostly in developed western markets in Chinese context would bring novelty and 
verify its applicable territory, adding new evidence to the literature.  
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3.3 Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure upon Agency Costs  
 
3.3.1 Statistic Description of the Data Sample       
 
Three types of independent variables are included: 
(1). debt to assets ratio was used to measure the capital structure (Gear);  
(2). the concentration level of shareholding would be shown through the percentage of the biggest 
shareholder and the top five shareholders to total amount of shares respectively (Con). 
(3). Control variables include the size of board (Board), company size (Size) and industry variable (Dum).  
The reason to choose company size and industry variables is because these are standard control variables; 
whereas size of board is a control variable relating to corporate governance.   
Hypothesis: companies with higher gearing level tend to have better performance.  
The sample was selected randomly from 211 non-financial companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange markets between 1999 and 2001 (www.csrc.com.cn); data of shareholding structure and 
size of board are from ‗Shenglong Financial Analysis Software‘. 
 
From table 3-4, the average total assets turnover has increased slightly from 0.5335 in 1999 to 0.5634 in 
2001. The net return on equity has dropped dramatically, from 11.42% in 1999, 9.98% in 2000 to 7.25% 
in 2001. There‘s no obvious change in debt to asset ratio. The comparison of the biggest shareholder to 
the top five shareholders shows it‘s quite common to have one dominating shareholder. The average 
operation return has been increasing and the number of board directors is rather stable. The average 
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management shareholding is 0.03%, and for each single year this number has been lower than 0.05%, 
displaying a decreasing tendency. The ratio of management shareholding is too low, and there‘s very 
remote possibility to increase the ratio of management shareholding to reduce the agency costs of 
shareholders. The factor of management shareholding has been ignored in this research. 
Table 3-4 Statistical Description of Variables  
 
Variables  
 
Total Assets Turnover 
Return on Equity % 
Debt to Assets Ratio % 
Biggest Shareholder % 
Top Five Shareholders % 
Sales Revenue(10,000  rmb) 
Board Size 
Managers‘ Share %  
1999 2000 2001 Panel Data 
Average 
0.5335 
11.4210 
40.4895 
48.7506 
61.6255 
90894.29 
9.6540 
0.0441 
Median 
0.4783 
10.4800 
38.5374 
49.0200 
61.6600 
46347.96 
9.0000 
0.0191 
Average 
0.5500 
9.9839 
39.6272 
46.3133 
59.2176 
116239.10 
9.7678 
0.0316 
Median 
0.4591 
9.6400 
38.7600 
45.5000 
60.1000 
65616.90 
9.0000 
0.0154 
Average 
0.5634 
7.2498 
41.4436 
46.3500 
58.3813 
136408.90 
9.7915 
0.0273 
Median 
0.4503 
7.8200 
41.1300 
45.9700 
58.9900 
73046.00 
9.0000 
0.0116 
Average 
0.5575 
9.6150 
40.4429 
46.6115 
59.6540 
115986.3 
9.7300 
0.0343 
Median 
0.4608 
9.5500 
40.0496 
47.2100 
60.5100 
62795.68 
9.0000 
0.0150 
 
3.3.2 Research Methodology  
 
Following previous discussions, various schools of theories suggest different impact of capital structure 
on agency costs and means of achieving optimal capital structure arrangement. M&M theory suggested 
debt is irrelevant in a perfect market and extended to 100% of debt over equity, considering the its tax 
reduction effect; trade-off theory argues the optimal balance would be achieved when the marginal 
benefits and costs of having debt equals to each other; debt is perceived as a positive signal sent by 
managers who are optimistic about companies‘ prospective; pecking order theory suggests there‘s a 
preference to use internally generated finance first, followed by debt and then equity; corporate control 
theory resonated such preference, though  it is motivated by managers‘ desire to maintain their control of 
the company rather than associated costs of financing. In terms of specific impact capital structure may 
have over agency costs, there are several competing theories: assets substitution effects of increasing debt, 
managers might take projects with negative NPV to transfer the risks to creditors, reducing firm value and 
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increasing agency costs; under-investment may occur when managers reject projects with positive NPV 
lest creditors reaps the benefits, also damage firm value and increase agency costs; free cash flow theory 
advocates debt‘s favourable function in reducing agency cost, since the managers would have less 
disposable cash flow when they have to satisfy debt and interest payment obligation.  
In order to empirically test the impact of capital structure on agency costs in the context of Chinese stock 
markets, the following variables have been selected. 
The dependent variable would be agency costs and one of the key independent variables would be the 
gearing ratio. This would show the impact of varying capital structure, in terms of debt to assets ratio, on 
the agency costs.  
Two alternative measures are used for agency costs: asset turnover rates and return on equity (ROE). The 
asset turnover ratio measures managers‘ ability to utilize assets efficiently, the same measure was used in 
research of Ang et al (1999). Higher asset turnover ratio means high sales level and cash flows generated 
from a given level of assets. High level of asset turnover ratio indicates efficient assets management and 
increased value for shareholders. The higher the assets turnover, the higher the efficiency of corporate 
assets utilization, the better the management capabilities and the lower the agency costs.  Thus, a positive 
relationship is expected between assets turnover ratio and gearing; similarly a positive relationship is 
expected between ROE and gearing. An alternative ratio ROE was used to measure agency costs. In 
China, most listed firms were transformed from SOEs. In order to protect the value of state assets, 
depreciation rates of fixed assets were determined by the state at an artificially low level, leading to an 
upward bias in the fixed assets; current assets would include inventory that either can‘t be sold at book 
value or can‘t be sold at all. Comparatively, ROE is more a more objective indicator of profitability. 
Higher ROE level indicates lower agency costs.  
Other independent variables were also included to test their respective impact on agency costs.  Due to the 
special ownership feature unique to Chinese listed firms, ownership concentration level was also included 
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in the test to see if it plays any significant role on agency costs. It would be amiss to ignore such a 
prominent feature all together. 
Control variables include size of board, firm size and industry dummy. The number of board directors 
measures the size of the board; the logarithm of sales revenue measure the firm size and Chinese listed 
firms‘ classified 13 industries, excluding financial firms, are used to measure the industry dummy. 4.This 
leaves 11 industry dummy variables.  
 
Simultaneous equations are used for estimation.        
Agency Costs = ß0 + ß1Gear + ß2Con + ß3 Board + ß4Size + ∑ßjDumjt     (1) 
Gear = ß5 + ß6Con + ß7ROE + ß8Val                               (2)  
 
To solve potential endogenous problems, it‘s necessary to look at ROE and gearing ratios. On one hand, 
the gearing level can affect ROE. (1) Higher gearing would reduce profit through financial charges; 
higher gearing could also increase profit through creditor‘s enhanced motivation and monitoring of the 
firm. (2) Higher gearing ratio can increase ROE without actually increasing profit.  
 
On the other hand ROE can affect gearing ratio. Higher ROE means the firm can refinance using internal 
finance or right shares instead of debt. Other than ROE, ownership structure can also impact on gearing 
ratio. Higher ownership concentration would motivate owners to reduce dividend and keep money in the 
firm, reducing gearing level. However, if the equity value growth rate is high, the firm can obtain plenty 
                                                                 
4
The 13 classified industries of Chinese listed firms include: (1) agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing; 
(2) mining; (3)manufacturing; (4) electricity, gas and water; (5) construction; (6) transportation, warehousing and 
postage ; (7) information, IT and software; (8) wholesale and retail; (9) finance and insurance; (10) real estate; (11) 
services; (12) culture (13) miscellaneous.  
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of cash. Val will be used to measure the equity value growth, which is equal to the year-end market value 
of ordinary shares divided by the year-end book value of ordinary shares (Leech & Leahy, 1991).  
 
Thus with two equations, one determining agency costs, the other the gearing ratio, another variable is 
needed to determine the gearing for equation (1) to be identified. When estimating the equation using 
asset turnover ratio, equation (1) itself would suffice. When using ROE to measure agency costs, both 
equations would be used. 
                                                  
3.3.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
Empirical results are presented in Table 3-5 and Table 3-6. Table 3-5 presents the OLS regression 
analysis of results of agency costs measured by asset turnover ratio and ROE. Table 3-6 presents the 
results of simultaneous equations of ROE.  
Table 3-5 Impact of Gearing and Shareholding Concentration Level on Agency Costs (Assets Turnover) - OLS 
 
Constant 
 
 Gearing 
Share Concentration  % Control Variable Adjusted R2 
Biggest 
Shareholder 
Top Five 
sharehol
ders 
Board Size  Corp Size Industry 
-1.1820 
(-8.0504)*** 
-1.2294 
(-7.9337)*** 
0.0028 
(3.4429)*** 
0.0027 
(3.3710)*** 
0.0002 
(0.2773) 
 
 
 
0.0010 
(0.9863) 
-0.0094 
(-1.9838) ** 
-0.0088 
(-1.8553) ** 
0.1718 
(14.4776)*** 
0.1716 
(14.8980)*** 
Yes  
 
Yes  
0.3986 
 
0.3995 
(The t-values are in brackets， *10% level, ** 5% level， ***1% level. )  
Equation: Assets Turnover=0+1Gear +2Con +3 Size +4 Board +j  Dumj t           
 
(1). Agency Costs Measured by Total Asset Turnover   
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In Table 3-5, the result shows total asset turnover as the dependent variable measuring agency costs. 
There are three independent variables: gearing, concentration of shares and control variables – size of 
board, size of company and industry dummy. The first two lines report the regression result on gearing 
together with the biggest shareholder concentration and the following two lines show the regression result 
on gearing and the top 5 shareholders concentration respectively. They both demonstrated similar results. 
 
Under both circumstances, either using the concentration level of the biggest or the top five shareholders, 
a positive relationship between asset turnover ratio and gearing was identified, all significant at better 
than 1%.  This shows firms with higher gearing ratio are more efficient in their assets utilization. 
 
 Under both cases, using the concentration level of either the biggest shareholders or the top 5 
shareholders, no significant relationship was identified between the level of ownership concentration and 
agency costs. This result coincides with Singh et al (2001); they found when the agency costs are 
measured by total asset turnover ratios, the concentration level of shareholders irrelevant to agency costs. 
Among the control variables, the coefficient between the size of board and the total asset turnover ratio is 
negative, with a significance of 5%, meaning bigger board size is less efficient. There‘s a positive 
relationship between firm size and assets utilization, significant at 1%, suggesting large firms have more 
efficient corporate governance. There are five industries‘ coefficients significant with asset turnover, 
electricity, transportation, wholesale and retail, real estate and services industry. Except for the wholesale 
and retail industry, the coefficients of other industries are negatively related to asset turnover. 
Table 3-5 shows gearing ratio has a significantly positive relationship with firms‘ performance measure 
by asset turnover ratio, indicating firms with higher gearing would also have better performance in terms 
of asset management efficiency.  
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(2). Agency Costs Measured by ROE. 
 
Similar to table 3-5, table 3-6 displayed results with ROE as the dependent variable in the regression 
analysis. The first two lines reported the regression result on capital structure with biggest shareholder 
ownership concentration and the following two lines reported results with the top 5 ownership 
concentration. Control variables include board size, firm size and industry dummy.  
Table 3-6 Impact of Gearing and Shareholding Concentration Level on Agency Costs (ROE) -OLS 
 
Constant 
 
 Gearing 
Share Concentration  % Control Variable Adjusted 
R2 Biggest 
Shareholder 
Top Five 
shareholders  
Board Size  Corp Size Industry 
8.9014 
(2.5744)*** 
7.2598 
(1.9893)** 
0.1416 
(7.4026)*** 
0.1364 
(7.1781)*** 
0.02619 
(1.3788) 
 
 
0.0377 
(1.6420)* 
-0.5538 
(-4.9447)*** 
-0.5447 
(-4.8468)*** 
0.1217 
(0.4356) 
0.1817 
(0.6694) 
Yes  
 
Yes  
0.1663 
 
0.1674 
 
The t-values are in brackets， *10% level, ** 5% level， ***1% level.  
Equation: ROE=0+1Gear +2Con +3 Size +4 Board +j  Dumj t           
 
The gearing level has a positive relationship with ROE, at significance better than 1%, confirmed the 
result in table 3-5. Firms with higher gearing ratio have higher ROE. However, the ownership 
concentration result is different from table 3-5: the ROE result shows big shareholder are concerned about 
the productivity of the business and highly concentrated ownership structure would benefit the company 
performance.  
For the control variables, the result of board size is consistent with that of table 3-5, a significantly 
negative relationship with ROE at 1%. Firm size displayed positive relationship with ROE but not 
significant. The industry dummy for the 11 industries didn‘t show any significance except one at a 10% 
level. Together with the industry result from table 3-5, it proves the industry factor didn‘t play any 
significant role in deciding the agency costs.  
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Since the gearing level could be an endogenous variable, to solve the potential endogeneity issue, two 
equations are needed: one to determine the ROE one to determine gearing level. Therefore, in equation 
(2), the independent variable ROE in equation (1) became the dependent variable and the dependent 
variable in equation (1) became the independent variable. Again, concentration level was included in the 
equation to see whether concentration level has any significant relationship with gearing level.  Another 
variable included in equation (2) is the market to book value of listed firms‘ equity so as to make the 
simultaneous equation identifiable. This value is calculated by dividing the price per shares by the book 
value per share. It‘s a measurement of firms‘ performance and the lower the better since indicates the firm 
is undervalued and would be a good investment choice. 
 ROE = ß0 + ß1Gear + ß2Con + ß3 Board + ß4Size + ∑ßjDumjt      (1) 
Gear = ß5 + ß6Con + ß7ROE + ß8Val            (2)  
 
Table 3-7 and table 3-8 report the results of the simultaneous equations. For equation (1), result shows 
that gearing has positive relationship with ROE, significant at 1%. This result support Jensen‘s (1986) 
theory of debt‘s monitoring role. This is examined by Harris & Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990), and it is 
empirically demonstrated by Maloney et al (1993) and Gul & Tsui (1998). Firms with higher gearing are 
subject to more restrictions of debt covenant and more supervision from creditors than those financed 
primarily with equity. This resonates with theories advocating the benefits of debts, such as the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem (under a classical tax system the optimal structure would include virtually 
only debt), the theory of signal function of capital structure and pecking order theory and corporate 
control theory.  
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Table 3-7 Results for Equation (1): 
 
Constant  
Variable 
 
Gearing 
Share Concentration  % Control Variable 
Biggest  
Share-holder 
Top Five 
 share-holders 
Board Size  Corp Size Industry 
-50.1593 
(-9.3704)*** 
-25.6625 
(114.1235)*** 
0.8332 
(18.7996)*** 
0.6978 
(428.5688)*** 
 0.1198 
(102.6309)*** 
 
 
 
0.0895 
(35.6543)*** 
-0.0179 
(-2.6085)*** 
-0.0385 
(-3.0672) 
0.1859 
(11.3209)*** 
0.3490 
(12.0077)*** 
Yes 
 
Yes 
ROE = ß0 + ß1Gear + ß2Con + ß3 Board + ß4Size + ∑ßjDumj t      (1) 
 
The first two lines show the results using biggest shareholders‘ concentration level and the last two lines 
show the results with the top five shareholders‘ concentration level. The results using the biggest and top 
five shareholders‘ concentration level displayed similar results. For equation 1, all the results showed 
these two variables had positive relationship with ROE, at a significant level of 1%. This result supported 
opinions of Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Yafeh & Yosha (2003) that big shareholders play a very important 
role in corporate governance. 
  
However, in equation 2, the concentration level of shareholding structure had a negative relationship with 
gearing. This means big shareholders prefer financing through equity rather than debts. The reason can be 
explained by CSRC‘s requirements of right share issuance: listed firms‘ ROE over the past three years 
must be more than 10%. Therefore, firms with ROE level higher than 10% would tend to refinance 
through equity rather than debt. This result conforms to Shleifer and Vishny‘s (1997) finding that large 
shareholders claim they both have a general interest in profit maximization and enough control over the 
assets of the firm to have their interest respected.  
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Table 3-8 Results of Equation (2) 
 
Constant  
Share Concentration  %  Equity Market to 
Book Value Biggest  
Share-holder 
Top Five 
 share-holders 
ROE % 
34.7605 
(12.1722)*** 
34.7928 
(9.1036)*** 
-0.1694 
(-3.2660)*** 
 
 
-0.13278 
(-2.1735)** 
1.3532 
(4.4911)*** 
1.3031 
(4.4705)*** 
0.1105 
(0.5409) 
0.2024 
(1.0390) 
          Gearing= ß5 + ß6Con + ß7ROE + ß8Val            (2)  
This study also provided new evidence for the conflict between big shareholders and small shareholders. 
Since the board of directors are mostly appointed by the big shareholders, the board‘s decisions reflect the 
will of the big shareholders. The positive relationship between big shareholders and ROE confirmed by 
the results in table 3-7 proves that big shareholders are motivated to reduce agency costs and maximize 
their value. However, the non-significant positive relationship between big shareholders and asset 
turnover ratio in Table 3-5 indicates they are not genuinely interested in increasing the operation 
efficiency. The significant negative relationship between big shareholders and gearing suggests big 
shareholders‘ are biased against using debt, a less costly source of capital, showing that big shareholders 
would sacrifice small shareholders‘ interest for their own interest. 
 
The size of board has a negative relationship with agency costs, the coefficient from regression result is 
significant at higher than 1%. This indicates board directors demonstrated value-damaging behaviour to 
listed companies. 
 
All related coefficients between the size of company and ROE has a significance level of higher than 1%, 
meaning big companies are more efficient at dealing with agency issues. In equation 2, ROE is positively 
relevant to gearing at a significant level of 1% or 5%. The equity market-to-book value is not significant.  
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3.4 Conclusion  
 
 There have been many research conducted concerning agency costs in developed markets, however not 
enough attention has been paid to emerging market like China. The contribution of this study is two-fold: 
firstly, it contributes to the literature of the impact of capital structure on agency costs in Chinese context. 
Second, among the limited research concerning capital structure, Yan Yanyang (2001) analyzed the 
relationship between the capital structure of Chinese listed companies and agency costs but no empirical 
research has been conducted.  This study provided statistical evidence on firm capital structure and 
agency costs measured in terms of asset turnover and ROE. This chapter focused on empirical study 
testing the relationship between agency costs and companies‘ capital structure/ ownership concentration 
level. Using two different types of measurement for agency costs, the results are slightly different.  
 
(1). When measured with assets turnover ratio, agency costs appear to be lower for firms with h igher 
gearing ratio, supporting theories advocating debt‘s favourable function in reducing agency costs. Under 
both circumstances, either using the concentration level of the biggest or the top five shareholders, a 
positive relationship between asset turnover ratio and gearing was identified, all significant at better than 
1%.  This shows firms with higher gearing ratio are more efficient in their assets utilization with lower 
agency costs. 
No significant positive relationship were identified between agency costs and the level of ownership 
concentration, indicating big shareholders don‘t necessarily make positive contribution to firms‘ 
performance in terms of operational efficiency (since measure by asset turnover ratio). 
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Size of board showed negative relationship with agency costs, significant at 5%, demonstrating value-
damaging behaviour of large board. At a significance level of 1%, large firms displayed higher efficiency 
in reducing agency costs. 
(2)When measured with ROE, simultaneous equations were used to solve the endogeneity problem.  
The positively significant relationship (at 1%) between agency costs and gearing using assets turnover 
ratio in previous section get confirmed by results using ROE. There‘s strong evidence supporting debt‘s 
favourable function in reducing agency costs. 
When measured by ROE, agency costs efficiency seems to be positively related with level of ownership 
concentration. Also firms with higher concentration level of ownership prefer to finance through equity 
rather than debt, demonstrated through the negative relationship between gearing and ownership 
concentration level.  
Again, a negative relationship (5%) between size of board and agency costs efficiency was identified, 
confirming results from previous section measuring agency costs using assets turnover ratio. Consistently, 
large firms display better efficiency in reducing agency costs. 
In summary, using two different types of agency costs to test the relationship between agency costs and 
capital structure, the two sets of results showed strong (1%) and consistent conclusion: higher level of 
gearing help to improve firm performance and reduce agency costs. 
There‘s discrepancy when it comes to the role of highly concentrated ownership though. When measured 
by assets turnover ratio, no significantly positive relationship can be identified, suggesting big 
shareholders are not necessarily efficient in improving operational efficiency. Only when measured by 
ROE, a significantly positive relationship (1%) can be identified. So we can‘t come to a categorical 
conclusion that big shareholders always help to improve firm performance. 
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In fact, the negative relationship between big shareholder and their preference to finance through equity 
rather than the relatively low cost debt, suggests they could be demonstrating value-damaging behaviour. 
This shows a conflict of interest between large shareholder and minority shareholder. 
This study shows a positive relationship between firm performance and gearing for Chinese listed firm.  
This seems to support arguments for debts‘ beneficial function in firm performance, such as M&M theory: 
without bankruptcy costs, firms should try to max out their borrowing capacity to increase their 
performance and firm value. This would seem like particularly good advice for Chinese firms with strong 
state background, if not universally true elsewhere. This is because of the unique feature of Chinese banks. 
Most Chinese firms get their loans from the state-controlled commercial banks. The state fully owns the 
four commercial banks: Industrial and Commercial Banks of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank and Bank of China. In a market where the state is both the creditor and the borrower, 
profit maximization is not always the top priority. Out of considerations such as social stability, 
unemployment concern etc, firms with poor performance don‘t have to worry about bankruptcy costs, 
since the state could pressure banks to renegotiate and extend their debts instead of forcing liquidation 
and shut down. Without bankruptcy costs as the deterrent, the idealized conditions of M&M theory is a de 
facto reality in the unique environment of Chinese market. Research by Tian & Estrin (2008) also 
provided similar evidence supporting the rather surprising positive role state may play in listed firms. 
They described the relationship as U-shaped: though state ownership at a low concentration level may 
prove to be a negative impact on firm performance, higher concentration level of state ownership would 
actually increase firm performance. They chalked it up to the preferential treatment and government 
partiality: when the state‘s stake is big enough it would be motivated enough to improve corporate 
performance. 
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The result of this study is seemingly different from the study by Tian & Estrin (2007), they contended a 
positive relationship existed between high gearing ratio and agency costs, measured by empire building, 
managerial entrenchment and managerial perquisites. The main differentiating factor for this study and 
their study is the different proxies used to measure agency costs. Tian and Estrin used a very specific and 
close measurement of agency costs, while this study used firm performance measures. 
 
The result of this study also shows conflict of interest between big shareholders and small shareholders. 
This is caused by principal‘s moral hazard, whose pursuit of self-interest led to a lose-lose situation when 
they completely ignore investors‘ interest and eventually lose the minority shareholders‘ trust (Gary 
Miller, 2005). This seems prevalent in the privatization process of previous state-owned enterprises. 
Similar evidence can be found in the privatization in Eastern and Central Europe (Lipton & Sachs, 1990b)  
in terms of government retained residual income. In the process of privatization, management and 
workers might take advantage of the muddled redefinition of residual income and enrich their own 
interest at the cost of the state (Lipton & Sachs, 1990b).  
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Chapter 4 2005-2006 Ownership Reform and Impact of Separated 
Ownership and Control on Chinese Firm Value  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the literature review summarized by Claessen et al (2000), Berle and Means (1932) depicted a picture 
of widely held corporations in the U.S. in their work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  
This notion was supported by later works such as Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Penrose (1959) and 
Williamson (1964). Similar notion was advocated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart 
(1980). More recently, different opinions has been voiced, suggesting existence of concentration level in 
even big U.S. corporations (Demsetz 1983, Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Shleifer and Vishney 1986, Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishney 1988). La Porta et al (1999) were the first to use ultimate ownership to find out who 
has the most voting rights in the 27 richest countries in the world. Claessens et al (2000) furthered this 
line of study to include 9 countries/regions in East Asia.  
 
However, in the above studies, either the 27 richest countries in the world or the 9 East Asia ones, China 
as an important global and regional economic power has been left out. This is partly due to the nature of 
Chinese stock market as an emerging market; it is still in the process of developing rules and regulations.  
For studies earlier than 2001, it is difficult to obtain data of ownership structure on Chinese listed firms: 
CSRC didn't require listed firms to disclose their ownership status until 2001, researches conducted at 
earlier years wouldn't have the required information; even later on when firms began to provide such 
information, English version is not compulsory, posing another obstacle. Also, there hasn‘t been any study 
of Chinese listed firms‘ ownership structure using the concept of ultimate ownership, a concept first 
applied by La Porta (1998, 1999), previous study of Chinese ownership structure were mostly about 
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immediate ownership. This makes it highly necessary to conduct research regarding the ultimate 
ownership structure for Chinese listed firms, filling in a gap in this area. 
 
Another reason to conduct an up-to-date ownership structure study on Chinese market would be the 2005-
2006 ownership structure reform. This is the most substantial ownership structure change in Chinese 
stock market history since its establishment in the 1990s. By allowing around two third of non-circulating 
share to become fully circulating shares, negotiations were conducted by each individual listed firms with 
their respective existing shareholders regarding compensations. It is quite conceivable that different 
negotiation skills, circumstances and investors‘ investment choices and strategies would have varied 
ownership changes in the end. A comprehensive study and comparison of the ownership structure before 
and after the reform would be highly necessary. 
 
There have been many influential researches about the separation of ownership and control. In the widely 
quoted Nobel Laureate‘s co-authored article ‗Separation of Ownership and Control’, Fama & Jensen 
(1983 a) discussed in great length about the concept of separated ownership and control. For them, this 
involves organizations in which ‗important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth 
effects of their decisions.‘ Agency costs arise when decision managers are not the residual claimants, thus 
a separate management control is necessary to evaluate the decision management. For small organizations, 
combining decision management, decision control and residual claimant would minimize agency costs. 
However, for large organizations, separated ownership and control would be more beneficial. This 
theoretical discussion laid important foundation for future research. 
 
La Porta et al (1999) were the first to use the concept of ultimate owners. They conducted a study of the 
corporate ownership of the world‘s 27 rich countries/regions (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, U.K., United States, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, 
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Switzerland).Their study suggests ownership and control can be separated to the benefits of large 
shareholders.  
 
Claessen (2000) applied the same method used by La Porta et al (1999) to conduct similar study on the 9 
East Asian countries/regions (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand). They contended that due to weak legal system and protection of 
investors in emerging market, separated ownership and control exacerbates agency problem and damage 
firm value. 
This chapter will include two parts. The first part will give a very detailed account of the 2005-2006 
ownership reform in Chinese stock market, providing initiation background of reform, reform stages and 
empirical comparison of the extent of reform, using La Porta‘s method of tracing down the voting right of 
ultimate owner. This would be the first study using the ultimate ownership concept to assess the reform in 
2005-2006. 
 
The second part will use data collected from the first part, testing the impact of separated ownership on 
firm value, providing empirical evidence of Fama & Jensen‘s theoretical discussion using data from 
Chinese stock market. 
 
This study will be the first to use data after the 2005-2006 reform and ultimate ownership theory to 
analyse the impact of separated ownership and control of listed firm‘s value in Chinese stock market.  
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4.2 Chinese Stock Market 2005-2006 Ownership Reform   
 
4.2.1Background 
 
The construction of Chinese stock market has been very unique. Ever since the establishment of its stock 
market in 1990, there's been the separation of circulating and non-circulating shares for SOEs: only about 
1/3 shares are allowed to trade on the market, the majority 2/3 is generally held by the state and not 
permitted to trade. Such arrangement has been designed to protect state assets. It has served the purpose 
of appeasing voices against establishing the Chinese equity market, worrying it would either make the 
state lose control of the state assets or put too much pressure on the then very fragile stock market with 
such huge demand of capital.  
 
However such arbitrary arrangement did have its downside. According to data from National Statistical 
Bureau of China (NSBC), by the end of 2004 the national GDP increased about 9.5%, a performance not 
reflected accordingly by the Chinese stock market. For instance, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index (SSE Composite Index) dropped about 15.15% during the same period of time. Generally stock 
market goes hand in hand with national economy, working as a thermometer of economic health; such an 
obvious divergence usually indicates problems. This can be supported by macroeconomic evidence from 
NSBC. In year 2000, the SSE Composite Index increased more than 50%, far more than the 8% annual 
GDP. Since its inauguration in 1990, SSE Composite Index started at 100 point and reached 2245 point in 
2001, an dramatic increase of 2100%; even compare to the 1250 point at the beginning of 2005, it is still 
as high as 13 times its starting point. GDP during the same period of time increased only about 200%. 
 
Such dramatic expansion of Chinese stock markets is partly due to its method of expansion: taking the 
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golden eggs by killing the hen. Companies keep grabbing money from investors by issuing large amount 
of shares even though their performances don‘t match up. As a result, investors gradually lose faith in the 
stock markets. This is why the stock markets have been bearish in years before 2005, lingering at around 
1200 points. Although public companies were in dire need of capital, investors were very reluctant to get 
in the market. Even favourable policies from the government can‘t fundamentally change the very 
desperate situation, such as the ‗State 9 Opinions‘ issued on 1st February, 2004 and capital gains tax 
reduction.   
 
The division of circulating shares and non-circulating shares has been the main target of criticism. 
Although this was meant to protect the state property, in fact preventing free circulation of almost 2/3 of 
total shares rendered the self regulating function of market invalid and almost useless in punishing 
incompetent managers or violation of corporate governance since it‘s literally impossible for other 
investors to collect majority shares; shareholders can only express their opinions passively by ‗vote by 
feet‘ and sell their shares.  
 
Various solutions were proposed to solve this problem. One of them is to set up a ‗C‘ share just for the 
transfer of state shares. This was actually taken into practice very briefly since 4th January 2004. It was 
stipulated that all the state shares on the market must register with SZSE for transfer, and shareholders 
can have a weekly update about the latest transferring status of state shares. However, the market show 
very little reaction to this arrangement, and it was proven to be a temporary and not a fundamental change 
the market expected. Eventually, complete elimination of the unreasonable artificial arrangement of 
having ‗non-circulating shares‘ seems the only rational choice.  
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4.2.2 Stages of the Reform 
 
A very stagnant Chinese stock market propelled the state to make up its mind for a fundamental reform. 
Its official inauguration date is the 29 April 2005, marked by the announcement of ‗Notice about Relevant 
Issues in the Reform Trial of Publically Listed Companies‘ by CSRC. The process is a trial and error 
process, since this is unique to Chinese stock market. The plan was to have two groups of trial firms first 
to test water. The selecting criteria are companies with healthy performance and steady development over 
the years, and four firms were selected for the first round. 
 
All four companies share some common points:  
 
(1). None of them are central government state companies; rather they belong to either municipal 
government or run by families, one of them is even a joint venture with foreign firms.  Since it is a 
process of trial and error, leaving central government state companies out would be easier to control the 
consequences in case anything goes wrong. This is an obvious cautionary decision.  
 
(2). Their ownership structures are all relatively simple: the controlling shareholders have absolute control 
over the firm. For instance, three firms‘ top shareholders have more than 50% of the shares (50.40%, 
72.42% and 74.51%), and their second shareholders only have about 1%. Thus it would be easier to get 
consensus about how and how much to compensate the circulating shares‘ shareholders. Since by 
allowing non-circulating shares to circulate on the market is in effect diluting the ownership of each share 
held by previous circulating shareholders. Compensating properly means it would both ensure the interest 
of previous circulating shareholders and previous non-circulating shareholders. This is the focus of 
attention for the general meeting of shareholders and the key debating issue for the appropriate proposal 
of each individual listed firm.  
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(3).They are all A share companies. No B share or H share companies were selected.  
 
(4).Their performances are all relatively strong, no loss for the past 3 years. They were never publically 
renounced by CSRC and had a very clean slate.  
 
The first stage of reform proceeded rather slowly, from the time the four companies were selected (9 May 
2005) to the date the second round of trial firms (totally 42 companies) were selected (19th June 2005), 
more than a month has passed. Another three months passed before the overall reform started officially at 
12th September 2005.From then on, the process was largely accelerated, in total 64 groups of companies 
were requested to reform over the next 16 months, about 97.86% of the total market value of all the listed 
companies on SSE and about 96.76% of the overall market value of the SZSE main board, with only 40 
not yet started the reform by end of 2006. 
 
4.2.3 Data  
 
The initial data sample includes all the 64 groups of companies, 1250 companies in total, announced by 
CSRC to proceed with the reforming process from 29th April 2005 to 31st December 2006. Among them, 
795 are listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), taking about 97.86% of the total market value of all 
the listed companies on SSE, with only 18 companies in SSE not entering the reform process yet. The 
other 455 companies entered the reform process before 2006 are listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE), taking about 96.76% of the overall market value of the SZSE main board, with only 22 
companies in SZSE not yet started the reform. 
 
The screening process for all the 1250 companies then involves selecting only those that have finished the 
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reform process by end of 2006 so that the 2006 annual reports published by April 2007 would be able to 
accommodate and reflect the ownership structure changes. Besides, companies with very poor 
performances would be excluded from the sample, normally marked by CRSC as ‗ST (special treatment)‘ 
companies that suffering losses for the past three years. Also, companies in the financial industry or real 
estate industry would be excluded due to their own unique leverage levels. Finally, companies that have 
missing data would also be excluded. After above mentioned screening process the final sample of this 
study includes 987 companies in total, 229 finished the reform by end of 2005 and 758 companies 
finished their reform by end of 2006. This is about 80% of all the companies listed on the two stock 
markets in China (SSE and SZSE), and their status should be a quite comprehensive and fair reflection 
about the genuine status of the overall Chinese listed firms. 
 
Mainly two sources of data are used to provide the needed information in this study.  
 
One is first hand data of companies‘ ownership structures, listing times, gearing ratios and other financial 
information etc, coming directly from the listed companies‘ official annual reports. They are publicly 
available at the website of Chinese Security Regulatory Committee (www.csrc.cn). For the companies 
that finished their reform by 2005, their annual reports of year 2003, 2004 and 2005 are used. The reason 
to choose year 2004 is because that's the year before the ownership reform started, it helps to paint a clear 
picture to compare the situation before the reform and afterwards. The annual reports in 2005 were 
selected since that‘s the time the actual reform initiated as well as the time when some of the listed firms 
finished their reform. Leverage level obtained from year 2003 annual reports would serve as an 
instrument for estimation purpose at the next statistical analysis stage. For similar reasons companies that 
finished their reform by 2006 have their annual reports of year 2004, 2005 and 2006 obtained.  
 
The other source of information is from website of sina finance (biz.finance.sina.com.cn), providing the 
year end trading price of stocks in order to determine the year end market value of the stocks.      
65 
 
 
The ownership structure before and after the 2005 reform will be discussed, with analysis of the extent of 
actual change and its implications.  
 
The empirical results will be presented in two groups: companies that finished their reform by end of 
2005 and companies that finished their reform by end of 2006.  For companies that finished their reform 
by 2005, data from both 2004 and 2005 will be used in order to compare the status before and after the 
reform. For companies that finished their reform in year 2006, data from both 2005 and 2006 would be 
used for purpose of comparison, to see the actual changes before and after the reform.   
 
The overall impact of the 205-2006 reform on the ownership structure of the listed firms on Chinese stock 
markets will be discussed in three aspects: the control level (absolute and relative control), management 
involvement, and aspects such as pyramid control, crossholding and differentiated voting rights.  
 
4.2.4 Ownership Structure Comparison: Control Level  
 
Control and ownership will be categorized into two groups: absolute control and comparative control 
 
Absolute control: the owner has the absolute control over the company if he has more than 50% of its 
voting right.  
 
Comparative control: refers to companies whose biggest owner has more than 20% but less than 50% of 
the voting right. For instance, Tsinghua Tongfang LTD (code 600100), one of the first companies that 
went through the ownership reform, 50.40% of its shares belong to the state, that makes the state its 
ultimate owner having absolute control over the company. On the other hand, Shanghai Jinling‘s (600621) 
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ultimate owner only has comparative control over the company since they only control 26.39% of the 
total shares.  
 
(A) Absolute Control 
 
The concentration level of shareholder ownership has been largely reduced after the reform; though still 
remain at quite a high level.  
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a. Companies Finished Reform by 2005 
 
Table 4-1 The Ultimate Ownership of Listed Firms: Comparison Before and After Reform in 2005  
 
(1) For the 227 companies finished their reform by end of 2005 (see Table 4-1), the number of firms with 
ultimate owners having absolute control (holding more than 50% of the total company stocks) was 77 
before the reform,  33.92% of all the companies. Among them, about 85.71% were owned by the state; 
10.39% owned by individuals and their families; only less than 4% were owned by companies and TVEs.  
 
(2)After the reform in 2005, the total number of companies with absolute controller dropped from 77 to 
48, a reduction of almost 40% and the percentage of firms with absolute control owners reduced from 
about 33.92% to 24.67%. The sub-structure among different types of owners is quite stable, and 85.71% 
of the companies with absolute owners are still the state, 10.71% of them are individuals and their 
families.   
  
Ultimate Owners Number of Firms (%) with 
Absolute Control  Owner    
Number of Firms (%) with  
Comparative Control 
Owner 
No Ultimate Owner 
 Before After Before After Before After 
State 66  
 (85.71%) 
48   
(85.71%) 
54  
(45.76%) 
64   
(56.14%) 
— — 
Individual/Family 8  
  (10.39%) 
6     
(10.71%) 
57  
(48.31%) 
46   
(40.35%) 
— — 
TVE 1  
     (1.30%) 
1       
(1.79%) 
2      
(1.69%) 
1       
(0.88%) 
— — 
Company 2 
      (2.60%) 
1       
(1.79%) 
5      
(4.24%) 
3       
(2.63%) 
— — 
Total Number of Firms 77 56 118 114 32 57 
Percentage (out of 227) 33.92% 24.67% 51.98% 50.22% 14.10% 25.11% 
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b. Companies Finished Reform by 2006 
 
Table 4-2 The Ultimate Ownership of Listed Firms: Comparison Before and After Reform in 2006  
Ultimate Owners Number of Firms (%) with 
Absolute Control  Owner    
Number of Firms (%) with  
Comparative Control Owner 
No Ultimate Owner 
 Before After Before After Before After 
State 195  
(96.53%) 
102 
(94.44%) 
312  
(78.39%) 
348  
(80.93%) 
— — 
Individual/Family 4        
(1.98%) 
4       
(3.70%) 
66     
(16.58%) 
65    
(15.12%) 
— — 
TVE 1        
(0.50%) 
1       
(0.93%) 
7        
(1.76%) 
4        
(0.93%) 
— — 
Company 2        
(0.99%) 
1       
(0.93%) 
13      
(3.27%) 
13      
(3.02%) 
— — 
Total Number of Firms 202 108 398 430 156 216 
Percentage  (out of 755) 26.75% 14.30% 52.72% 56.95% 20.53% 28.48% 
 
(3)For the 755 companies finished their reform by end of 2006 (see Table 4-2), the number of firms with 
ultimate owners having absolute control is 202 before the reform, 26.75% of all the companies. Among 
them, 96.53% are owned by the state; 1.98% owned by individuals and their families; only less than 1.5% 
are owned by companies and TVEs.  
 
(4)After the reform in 2005, the total number of companies with absolute controller dropped from 202 to 
108, a reduction of as much as almost 50%, and the percentage of firms with absolute control owners 
reduced from 26.75% to 14.30%. Again, similar to companies finished their reform in 2005 the 
subcategory of the different types of ownership remained stable, before and after the reform. 
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c. Overall Comparison Before and After the Reform. 
 
Table 4-3The Ultimate Ownership of Listed Firms: Overall Comparison  
Ultimate Owners No. of Firms (%) with 
Absolute Control Owner    
No. of Firms (%) with 
Comparative Control 
Owner 
No Ultimate Owner 
 Before After Before After Before After 
State 261  
(93.55%) 
150  
(91.46%) 
366  
(70.93%) 
412  
(75.74%) 
— — 
Individual/Family 12      
(4.30%) 
10      
(6.10%) 
123  
(23.84%) 
111  
(20.40%) 
— — 
TVE 2        
(0.72%) 
2        
(1.22%) 
9        
(1.74%) 
5        
(0.92%) 
— — 
Company 4        
(1.43%) 
2        
(1.22%) 
18      
(3.49%) 
16      
(2.94%) 
— — 
Total Number of Firms 279 164 516 544 188 273 
Percentage  (out of 982) 28.41% 16.7% 52.55% 55.40% 19.14% 27.8% 
 
Absolute control ownership is quite high for Chinese listed companies, 28.41% of all the selected listed 
companies had an absolute controller before the reform; even after the reform, that figure is still quite 
high at 16.7% (see Table 4-3). Among them, state owned companies take a very obvious majority: over 90% 
(93.55% and 91.46% before and after the reform) of all the listed companies that have an absolute 
controller are owned by state, showing that companies that have the highest concentration level are state-
owned ones.  
 
(B) Comparative Control 
 
Companies with comparative control are the ones own more than 20% but less than 50% of company 
stocks. The reason to choose the starting point of 20% instead of 10% as some other studies is because 
Chinese listed companies generally have a rather high concentration level, the average ownership for the 
biggest owners in 2004 is over 40% (40.62%) and there‘s no substantial difference if 10% has been 
chosen as the differentiating level. Even using a more stringent standard at 20% instead of 10%, over 70% 
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of firms got identifiable ultimate owners: 80.86% before the reform and 72.2% after the reform.   
 
a. Companies Finished Their Reform by 2005 
 
For the 227 companies finished their reform by 2005, more than half of them fall in the category of 
having an owner with comparative control, 51.98% for year 2004 and 50.22% for year 2005.  Of all the 
listed firms with comparative control owners, about half belong to the state and half belong to individuals 
and their families. Only less than 6% are owned by companies or TVEs. It has shown that after 2005 the 
percentage of relative controlled firms has increased. This is not surprising given the downsizing of the  
absolute control owner group during the same period of time. 
 
b. Companies Finished Their Reform by 2006 
 
For the 755 companies finished their reform by 2006, also more than half of them have owners with 
comparative control, 52.72% before and 56.95% after the reform. Though for companies finished their 
reform this year, state owners again take the majority at 78.39% before the reform, and 80.93% after the 
reform.  
 
c. Overall Comparison.  
 
Pulling all the companies together, as in Table-3, over half of the companies have one ultimate owner 
with comparative control (52.55% and 55.40%), and about 70% of those owners are the state. Just like the 
absolute control category, the relative control group shows that state takes a very firm control of the 
majority listed companies both before and after the reform.  
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(C) Companies with No Ultimate Owner. 
 
Companies with their biggest owners stock holding of less than 20% are defined as companies with no 
ultimate owners. The results from all three tables show a consistent trend of reduced concentration, there 
are more companies with scattered ownership after the reform, increasing from lower than 19.14% to 27.8% 
(Table 4-3). If 10% was used as the bench mark instead, the result is still the same: more companies are 
widely held after the reform, though the actual percentage would change (percentage of widely held 
companies increase from 7% to 9.5%). 
 
4.2.5 Ownership Structure Comparison: Management Involvement.  
 
We define management involvement as when the ultimate owners themselves were holding one of the 
following positions during the period of our research: general manager, chief executive officer, chair of 
the board or a board director. This is a common mechanism employed by shareholders to reinforce their 
control over the firm. In this sample, the majority companies‘ (682 out of 982 companies before the 
reform; 669 out of 982 companies after the reform) biggest owner is state and it is common practice for 
the state to appoint its own representatives on key positions of companies for monitoring purposes. 
Besides these state controlled companies, 231 out of 313 companies have their biggest shareholders as 
part of the management team before the reform, and 237 out of 300 companies‘ biggest shareholders have 
management involvement. The ratio of management involvement is very high and quite steady over time. 
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4.2.6. Ownership Structure Comparison: Pyramid Control, Crossholding and 
Differentiated Voting Rights.  
 
Pyramid structure has been widely used in the listed companies. For companies finished reform by 2005, 
only 19 out of the 227 companies don‘t have pyramiding structure. For companies finished reform by 
2006, that rate is 49 out of 755 companies. These directly controlled companies showed a shorter chain of 
command, demonstrating a tighter control over the listed companies. In most cases their biggest 
shareholder is the state: all the 19 cases in 2005 are state owners; 39 out of the 49 cases in 2006 have state 
owners. This shows a strong influence from the state over some of the listed companies. 
 
Only 1 case of crossholding has been observed. Unlike other countries, it is not common for listed 
companies in China to hold shares of other listed companies. 
 
Different voting right is also rather scarce with one observation only, with a TVE company. However, this 
is not part of the stocks‘ features, it happened when one big shareholder entrusted the voting rights to 
another. 
The average percentage of cash flow the biggest shareholders have is 40.62% in 2004, and 34.33% in 
2005 for companies finished reform by 2005; 36.41% in 2005 and 30.31% in 2006 for companies finished 
their reform by 2006; overall, before the reform the average shareholding for the biggest shareholder of 
all the companies in our sample is 37.39% and after the reform it is 31.29%. Although it is very clear that 
the ownership concentration level has reduced in many aspects, the ownership structure is still quite high 
at over 30% on average for all the companies and has remained rather stable in the sense that the biggest 
shareholders have pretty much been the same. For instance, for all the companies finished their reform in 
2005, only three companies have actually changed their biggest owners.  
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4.2.7 Conclusion. 
 
The most influential reform since Chinese stock markets‘ establishment started since April 2005. It aimed 
to rectify the fundamental structure of the unique feature of Chinese stock ownership, allow the 2/3 non-
circulating shares to circulate freely on the market.  
 
The study selected all the 1250 companies finished their reform by the end of 2006, about 97.86% of the 
total market value of all the listed companies on SSE and 96.76% of SZSE as the original sample. After 
excluding ST companies, financial companies and companies with missing data, 987 companies were 
included in the final sample, counting for over 80% of all listed companies on Chinese stock markets, a 
very comprehensive and representative sample of the overall status of this reform. 
 
This is the first study that collected comprehensive cross the market data to give a full picture of the scale 
and results of this most influential reform. It is the first study that presented the detailed and 
comprehensive ownership structure before and after the reform. 
 
From the three tables presented in the above section, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
(1).Chinese listed firms have highly concentrated ownership structure. 
Before the reform, only 19.14% of listed companies don‘t have any ultimate owner with control of over 
20%, even after the reform that figure is still as low as 27.8%.  
 
(2).Chinese listed firms are under strong influence of the state.  
For the over 70% of listed companies with ultimate owners, over 90% of the owners of absolute 
controllers are the state and over 70% of the comparative owners are also the state. 
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(3). It is prevalent for Chinese listed companies to have pyramid control.  
Over 90% of all listed firms have pyramid control structure. 
 
(4). The 2005-2006 reform has somehow changed the ownership structure.  
Although still a state dominant and highly concentrated ownership structure for most listed firms in China, 
the reform has reduced the control level. The number of firms with absolute ultimate owner has reduced 
from 279 to 164, a reduction of as much as 41.22%. The number of firms without any ultimate owner has 
increased from 188 to 273, an increase of 45.21%.  
 
(5). The fundamental ownership structure feature of Chinese listed firm remained largely the same. 
Although there has been undeniable evidence suggesting the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms 
has made some progress towards being more widely held corporations, facts remain that this is still a 
market with overwhelmingly strong government control, as discussed in previous points of (1) and (2). 
Nonetheless, it is still encouraging to see first signs of absolute state control getting loosened up, making 
space for more market force to come in place. Depending on each company‘s negotiation with their 
investors, normally the previously non-circulating shares would be allowed to become activated gradually 
over the following several years. This is a precaution taken to make sure the influx of large amount of 
available shares wouldn‘t be too overwhelming for the market. A gradually scheduled slow release of 
these shares would give the market as well as investor more time to prepare. An interesting follow up 
study could be conducted in several years‘ time to see the ownership structure then. 
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4.3 Empirical Study of Separated Ownership and Control on Chinese Listed 
Firms  
 
4.3.1 Definition of Ownership, Control and Separation Ratio  
 
To study the separation of ownership and control of listed firms, it‘s necessary to construct relevant data.  
Following Claessens et al (2000; 2002), similar method has been used to calculate the ownership and 
control power of listed firms.  
 
For companies with pyramid structures, the ownership of controlling shareholder equals the product of 
their ownership over the chain of control; the control power would be the weakest link over the chain of 
control.  
 
For instance, if B is A's biggest shareholder with 60% shares, and C is B's biggest shareholder with 40% 
shares, then C has 24% ownership of A, the product of 40% and 60%.  The control power of C over A 
would be 40%.  
 
To measure the level of separation between ownership and control, separation ratio of listed firms was 
calculated as ownership divided by control. The smaller the separation ratio, the more severe the situation 
of separated ownership and control is. For instance, in the example above, the separation ratio would be 
ownership of 24% divided by control level of 40%, equals to 0.6 separation ratio. A similar situation 
where B has 40% of shares in A and C has 40% of B, C would have 16% of the ownership of A, and 40% 
of control. The separation ratio would be 16/40=0.4 separation ratio. In both cases, the control power of C 
over A is 40%, however, in the latter case C only had 16% of ownership to achieve the same level of 
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control though its vested interest (actual ownership) is much lower (16% compare to 24%) than the 
previous case, thus the lower separation ratio of 0.4 (compared to 0.6) indicates a bigger gap between 
actual ownership and control, i.e. a more severe case of separated ownership and control and higher 
separation level. In a nutshell, the lower the separation ratio, the bigger the gap between owner‘s residual 
cash flow entitlement and actual decision making power, presenting a case of using very little actual 
ownership to exert much bigger influence on management decisions.  Fama & Jensen‘s theoretic 
discussion would suggest a positive relationship between the separation level and firm performance for 
listed firms. The actual result of Chinese listed firms would be presented at later section 4.4 empirical 
results.  
 
4.3.2. Types of Ultimate Ownerships:  
 
Similarly, the ultimate control theory was used for the study, and five types of ultimate owners will be 
included in this study:  
 
A. The state: companies with the state as the ultimate owner refer to the companies that are either directly 
controlled by relevant ministry or departments of central/provincial/municipal government or indirectly 
controlled by them through pyramid. The common characteristics of this type of listed firms are that 
normally their CEOs or G.M are appointed by relevant government agents. For this reason, we assume 
that all the firms in this category have management involvement, that is, the dummy variable describing 
all the state-owned listed firms for management involvement would be 1. 
B. Individuals and their family members: we don‘t differentiate among family members but will see them 
as one group that shares the same interests. 
C. Town and village enterprises (TVEs): this refers to companies that are controlled by a town or village.  
D. Companies, which means there‘s no ultimate owners, i.e. they are widely held companies.  
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E. Other. 
 
4.3.3 Research Methodology 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out that due to bigger shareholders possess the majority of company 
shares, they are motivated to monitor managers' behaviours, which help to resolve the issue of 'Free 
Riding' of small shareholders since they don't have sufficient incentive (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Also, 
the possession of majority shares enabled the big shareholders to actually monitor managers' behaviours. 
Particularly with increased shares held by big shareholders, their interest in the company also increases 
and convergence of managers' and shareholders' interest would emerge (Morck, 1988).  
 
Hypothesis 1: increased number of shares held by controlling shareholders would increase company value, 
there will be positive relationship between these two. 
 
When the control power of big shareholder exceeds their actual ownership, Claessens et al. (2002) 
pointed out due to their relatively small residual return at the listed firms, they are not sufficiently 
motivated to manage the company well; on the contrary with their comparatively strong control power 
they can conveniently transfer wealth out of the company by means of unfair insider trading, illegal 
guarantee etc to maximize their own interest at the cost of small shareholders, causing agency issues with 
other small shareholders and hurt companies' performances. Situation could be more severe in regions 
where legal protection is relatively weak, such as East Asia. Thus, hypothesis 2 is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: the separation of control power and ownership by controlling shareholders decreases the 
company value, there will be negative relationship between these two. 
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Variables and Dummy Variables 
Tq: Tobin‘s Q, i.e. company value, equals the sum of total market value of company and book value  
             of debts divided by total assets. The market value of companies is estimated as the products of  
             year-end share value and total number of shares. If the data on last day of trading is unavailable  
             the nearest date will be used. 
Return: Annual income from the company‘s main business. 
Gear:  Gearing ratio of company, equals the ratio of total debts divided by total assets 
Equ:  Ownership of listed firm. It equals to the product of ownership over the chain of control.  
Con: Control power of listed firm, equals the weakest amount of ownership over the chain of control.  
Sepa: Degree of separation. It equals to the ratio of ownership divided by control 
Lth:  The length of years since become public listed. For instance, if a company get listed on the same  
              year its Lth would be 0, if it get listed the year before its Lth would be 1, etc. 
Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Type: Although the original data has 5 different types of ownership, they got categorised into 2 large  
             categories: state-owned and non-state owned to see whether state-owned firms can outperform  
             non-state ones. 
 
Three dummy variables are included: 
 
Pyramid Structure (Pyram): this variable refers to companies whose ultimate owners and their direct 
owners are not the same, i.e. the ultimate owner doesn‘t own the listed company directly but through a 
chain of ownership. The existence of pyramid structure indicates the control from the ultimate owner is 
less tight, and thus would render their influence less effective, a detrimental effect and a negative sign 
would be expected from the estimation. All companies that have pyramid structure would be set at 1, 
otherwise their Pyram value would be 0.  
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Management involvement (M): if a company‘s ultimate owner holds positions as CEO, General Manager, 
or director of boards, etc, the value of its management involvement would be assumed as 1, otherwise it‘s 
0. In cases where the ultimate owner is the state or TVEs it is assumed to be 0, since the senior 
management staff would be directly appointed by governments or head of town or villages, they don‘t 
really share a personal interest in the wellbeing of the company. Thus all the state controlled companies 
and the companies whose head (i.e. CEO, General Manager or director of board) is not an ultimate owner 
would have a M value of 0, otherwise it is 1.  
 
Type of Ownership (Type): this variable indicates the types of ultimate ownership of a listed company. 
As discussed earlier there are altogether 5 types of different ownerships included in this research: the state, 
individuals and their family members, companies, town and villages, and others. Among them, we set the 
state controlled companies as 0, all the other types as 1. This way we get to compare the efficiency of the 
state controlled companies to companies with other ownerships.  
 
Research Model:  
Tqi=a0+a1Equi+a2Sepai+a3Pyrami+a4Geari+a5Mi+a6Lthi+a7Typem+ a8Sizei+ei 
Geari =a9+ a10Geari-1+ a11Tqi 
Returni=b0+b1Equi+b2Sepai+b3Pyrami+b4Geari+b5Mi+b6Lthi+ b7Typem+b8Sizei+ei 
Geari =b9+ b10Geari-1+b11Returni 
 
4.4 Empirical Results  
 
The estimation methodology in this study is Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS). This method is similar to 
Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) in the sense that it can deal with over identified simultaneous equations 
such as our model, but enjoys further advantage of dealing with contemporary correlation.  
 
Since the least square method is only applicable in cases that satisfy the 10 classic assumptions, for our 
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model many of these assumptions are violated such as the endogenous problem caused by more than one 
internal variable such as Tobin‘s q and the gearing level of a firm. To address the problem of endogeniety, 
TSLS would have sufficed. Since its principle is to express the simultaneous equations in form of all 
predetermined or external variables to avoid the problem of endogeniety. However, the other problem of 
contemporary correlation can‘t be dealt with TSLS only. Thus 3SLS would be a more appropriate choice 
since after the similar first two steps of TSLS, 3SLS further proceed to use GLS to address the 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. 
 
For purpose of comparison, Tobin‘s q and company‘s return were used to show the difference between the 
response of market valuation and a company‘s true value under the same situation. Thus two sets of 
simultaneous equations will be included: one with Tobin‘s q, the other with return, as indicated in the 
previous model.  
 
There are two sets of  hypothesis to be tested as state earlier: one focusing on the relationship between 
company value and companies‘ biggest owners‘ equity holding; the other is to estimate the relationship 
between company value and the separation of companies‘ biggest owners‘ shareholding and actual control 
power.  
 
The results will also be reported for companies that finished in year 2005 and 2006 separately, since the 
reform took place over two years. Companies finished their reform by end of 2005 will be included in the 
year 2005 tests with all corresponding data; while companies finished by end of 2006 will be included in 
2006 tests. 
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a. Statistical Analysis Results with Tobin‘s Q. 
Table 4-4 Year 2005- Tobin‘s Q Result 
Total system (balanced) observations 908  
     
     
 
Coefficient 
(Constant Value) 
Std. Error 
 
t-Statistic 
 
Prob 
.   
     
     
Constant1 6.215679 0.662205 9.386329 0.0000 
Equity 0.448584 0.181566 2.470645 0.0137 
Separation -0.111434 0.121410 -0.917835 0.3590 
Pyramid 0.012095 0.062355 0.193977 0.8462 
Gearing -0.020349 0.086677 -0.234768 0.8144 
Management -2.435119 0.228676 -10.64878 0.0000 
Length of Period 0.008767 0.006781 1.292953 0.1964 
Type 0.088992 0.089548 0.993801 0.3206 
Size -0.499832 0.075388 -6.630084 0.0000 
Constant2 0.280926 0.025964 10.81989 0.0000 
Gearing t-1 0.546221 0.039883 13.69571 0.0000 
Tobin’s Q -0.108417 0.014391 -7.533853 0.0000 
     
     
Determinant residual covariance 0.001757   
     
     
Equation: TQ=C(1)+C(2)*EQU+C(3)*SEPA+C(4)*PYRAM+C(5)*M+C(6) 
        *LEV+C(7)*LTH+C(8)*TYPE+C(9)*SIZE   
Observations: 454   
R-squared 0.468044     Mean dependent var 0.589935 
Adjusted R-squared 0.458481     S.D. dependent var 0.818291 
S.E. of regression 0.602164     Sum squared resid 161.3575 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.751161    
     
     
Equation: LEV=C(10)+C(11)*LEV_1+C(12)*TQ   
Observations: 454   
R-squared 0.713306     Mean dependent var 0.469087 
Adjusted R-squared 0.712034     S.D. dependent var 0.167889 
S.E. of regression 0.090093     Sum squared resid 3.660678 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.929397    
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Table 4-5 Year 2006 Tobin‘s Q Result 
     
     
 
Coefficient 
(Constant Value) 
Std. Error 
 
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
   
     
     Constant 4.968708 0.569791 8.720230 0.0000*** 
Equity 0.378787 0.157016 2.412405 0.0159** 
Separation -0.197839 0.098299 -2.012634 0.0442** 
Pyramid -0.009713 0.087782 -0.110645 0.9119 
Gearing 0.124186 0.084379 1.471753 0.1412 
Management -2.484488 0.176271 -14.09471 0.0000*** 
Length of Period 0.031511 0.007154 4.404645 0.0000*** 
Type -0.136928 0.079648 -1.719169 0.0857 
Size -0.363292 0.062877 -5.777856 0.0000*** 
Gearingt-1 0.788625 0.027929 28.23671 0.0000*** 
Tobin‘s Q -0.042798 0.010589 -4.041871 0.0001*** 
     
     
R-squared 0.191354     Mean dependent var 0.554012 
Adjusted R-squared 0.187065     S.D. dependent var 1.113427 
S.E. of regression 1.003898     Sum squared resid 1519.779 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.458329    
     
      
Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 shows that the level of biggest owner‘s shareholding has a positive relationship 
with company value: the higher the company‘s biggest shareholder‘s shareholding the higher the 
company value. This result is very significant at 1.37% and 1.59% respectively. Thus the first hypothesis 
is verified by the results with Tobin‘s Q as performance measurement. 
 
The results with Tobin‘s Q support the theory by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Grossman & Hart (1980), 
Morck (1988) etc that large percentage of shareholding would help to increase company value, that when 
the amount of shareholding increases the owner‘s interest would converge with that of the company and 
become more motivated to increase company value instead of seeking personal gains at the expense of the 
83 
 
company. 
 
Secondly, the level of separation of the biggest shareholders‘ actual ownership and their control power in 
both years‘ results showed negative relationship with companies‘ performances. The result for year 2005 
is not significant at 35.9%; it is significant for year 2006 sample at 4.42%. The second hypothesis is 
verified in both cases with Tobin‘s Q as performance measurement, although the result is only very 
significant for year 2006 sample.  
 
Other observations worth noticing including: 
 
(1) gearing level is significantly (both at better than 1% level) negatively related to company performance, 
meaning that the more a company financing through debt the worse a company performs; this supports 
the theory that debts can actually serve as a disincentive for listed firms since the shareholders would 
have less common interest with the companies. This result supports Tian and Estrin‘s (2007) finding that 
an increase in bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flows and decreases 
corporate efficiency. They find that bank lending facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth in 
government-controlled firms but constrains managerial agency costs in firms controlled by private owners. 
They believe the failure of corporate governance may derive from the shared government ownership of 
lenders and borrowers. 
 
(2) Company size is also significantly negatively relating to company performance (at better than 1% in 
both cases), indicating larger companies (SOEs in many cases) actually fare worse than smaller 
companies. 
 
(3) The number of years companies got listed is also significant for both cases, though in 2005 sample it‘s 
not significant while in year 2006 sample it‘s significant at better than 1% level 
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(4) Other variables such as management involvement, pyramid holding structure, and types of companies 
didn‘t show any significant relationship with the company performances. 
 
b. Statistical Analysis Results with Annual Return. 
Table 4-6 Year 2005 Annual Return Result 
Total system (balanced) observations 908  
     
     
 
Coefficient 
(Constant Value) 
Std. Error 
 
t-Statistic 
 
Prob 
.   
     
     
Constant 1 -9.32E+10 7.28E+09 -12.79394 0.0000 
Equity 3.42E+09 2.17E+09 1.575117 0.1156 
Separation -2.14E+09 1.48E+09 -1.451945 0.1469 
Pyramid -3.57E+08 7.61E+08 -0.469344 0.6389 
Management 1.21E+09 1.06E+09 1.139881 0.2546 
Gearing -3.37E+09 2.44E+09 -1.384544 0.1665 
Length of Period -3430998. 81850416 -0.041918 0.9666 
Type 5.12E+08 1.09E+09 0.470542 0.6381 
Size 1.05E+10 8.16E+08 12.91811 0.0000 
Constant 2 0.095890 0.015024 6.382266 0.0000 
Gearing -1 0.766921 0.030333 25.28337 0.0000 
Annual Return 6.44E-12 1.14E-12 5.622576 0.0000 
     
     
Determinant residual covariance 3.90E+17   
     
     
Equation: RETURN=C(1)+C(2)*EQU+C(3)*SEPA+C(4)*PYRAM+C(5) 
        *M+C(6)*Gear+C(7)*LTH+C(8)*TYPE+C(9)*SIZE  
Observations: 454   
R-squared 0.340648     Mean dependent var 2.98E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.328794     S.D. dependent var 7.80E+09 
S.E. of regression 6.39E+09     Sum squared resid 1.82E+22 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.218163    
     
     
Equation: LEV=C(10)+C(11)*Gear_1+C(12)*RETURN   
Observations: 454   
R-squared 0.569785     Mean dependent var 0.469087 
Adjusted R-squared 0.567877     S.D. dependent var 0.167889 
S.E. of regression 0.110364     Sum squared resid 5.493235 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.959157    
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Table  4-7 Year 2006 Annual Return Result    
Total system (balanced) observations 3034  
     
     
 
Coefficient 
(Constant Value) 
Std. Error 
 
t-Statistic 
 
Prob 
.   
     
     
Constant 1 -2.17E+11 1.96E+10 -11.06644 0.0000 
Equity 1.05E+10 5.60E+09 1.866479 0.0621 
Separation -2.97E+08 3.55E+09 -0.083838 0.9332 
Pyramid -1.66E+10 3.23E+09 -5.153890 0.0000 
Management -1.50E+09 3.06E+09 -0.489359 0.6246 
Gearing -7.56E+09 5.73E+09 -1.319696 0.1870 
Length of Period -4.27E+08 2.40E+08 -1.776989 0.0757 
Type 3.57E+09 2.88E+09 1.238078 0.2158 
Size 2.56E+10 2.14E+09 11.97032 0.0000 
Constant 2 0.070714 0.006026 11.73542 0.0000 
Gearing -1 0.884973 0.011898 74.37728 0.0000 
Annual Return 7.39E-13 1.81E-13 4.093771 0.0000 
     
     
Determinant residual covariance 5.99E+18   
     
     
Equation: RETURN=C(1)+C(2)*EQU+C(3)*SEPA+C(4)*PYRAM 
        +C(5)*M+C(6)*LEV+C(7)*LTH+C(8)*TYPE+C(9)*SIZE  
Observations: 1517   
R-squared 0.114153     Mean dependent var 3.87E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.109454     S.D. dependent var 3.41E+10 
S.E. of regression 3.22E+10     Sum squared resid 1.57E+24 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.034496    
     
     
Equation: LEV=C(10)+C(11)*LEV_1+C(12)*RETURN  
Observations: 1517   
R-squared 0.784377     Mean dependent var 0.497652 
Adjusted R-squared 0.784092     S.D. dependent var 0.173110 
S.E. of regression 0.080437     Sum squared resid 9.795777 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.896296    
     
     
In the above section, statistical analysis has been conducted to study the relationship between various 
variables and company‘s performance using Tobin‘s Q as the variable measuring companies‘ performance 
level.  
 
Tobin‘s Q has been calculated as the difference between a listed company‘s current market value (the 
product of year end stock value and total number of shares) and debt, divided by total assets. In another 
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word, Tobin‘s Q is the market perceived value of a company, which may or may not be the same as the 
actual company value. Therefore, as a test of robustness, listed companies‘ annual return was also used as 
an alternative measurement of the companies‘ performance. The results are presented in Table 4-6 and 
Table 4-7. 
 
Firstly, the two results (companies finished reform in year2005 and in year 2006 respectively) measured 
with return as the variable of company performance showed that the portion of biggest owner‘s 
shareholding has a positive relationship with company value: the higher the portion of shareholding by a 
company‘s biggest shareholder the higher the company value. This result is significant at 11.56% and 
6.21% respectively. Thus the first hypothesis is verified by the results with companies‘ return as 
performance measurement. This is consistent with the results measured by companies‘ Tobin‘s Q levels, 
only slightly less significant. 
 
Secondly, the level of separation of the biggest shareholders‘ actual ownership and their control power in 
both years‘ results showed negative relationship with companies‘ performances. However, the result for 
year 2005 is significant at 14.69%, and it is insignificant for year 2006 sample. The second hypothesis is 
partly verified in both cases by results with companies‘ return as performance measurement, although the 
result is only significant for year 2005 sample. Again, the result is consistent with the previous set of 
results with Tobin‘s Q as companies‘ performance measurement. 
 
Other factors didn‘t show significant relationship such as gearing level, the number of years companies 
got listed, and management involvement. State and non-state owned companies didn‘t show significant 
difference in terms of performance. Company size is significantly negatively relating to company 
performance (at better than 1% in both cases), indicating larger companies actually fare worse than 
smaller companies. Different from previous sets of estimates is that the pyramid holding structure 
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demonstrated a significantly negatively relationship with company performance when it‘s measured by 
main business returns, significant at better than 1% level for year 2006, not significant for year 2005.    
 
The data with both Tobin‘s Q and return as measurement of companies‘ performances showed very strong 
support to the theory by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Grossman & Hart (1980), Morck(1988) etc that large 
percentage of shareholding would help to increase company value, that when the amount of shareholding 
increases the owner‘s interest would converge with that of the company and become more motivated to 
increase company value instead of seeking personal gains at the expense of the company; while gearing 
would reduce companies‘ value. The results also support finding of Tian and Estrin (2007) that when the 
shareholding is large the government can actually improve corporate value, which can be interpreted in 
terms of ownership concentration and government partiality.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
Since its establishment in the 1990s, Chinese stock market has gone through rapid development. Even so, 
it is still an emerging market with a rather short period of development history compare to the more 
developed and mature stock markets in the world, their history of development can be traced back to the 
early 17th century (Amsterdam Stock Exchange established in 1602), over 400 years ago 
 
Chinese stock market, as a relatively new market is still in its formative stage and going through changes. 
Thus it is highly necessary to conduct relevant researches to provide up to date information for investors, 
policy makers and the general public for a better and more accurate understanding of its true position.  
In the previous chapters, three empirical studies were conducted targeting Chinese stock market and 
corporate governance issues.  
 
The first empirical study aims to study the overall and general market discipline. This could serve as a 
first step for a general understanding of the overall market. This study followed the research methodology 
proposed by Battacharya et al (2000), using Chinese market data. Due to lack of empirical studies 
previous to this study, this could contribute to fill in a gap in this area, using data to test the general 
market discipline level of Chinese stock market. Two types of studies were conducted. The first one is 
event study, to determine the existence of information spillage; the second one is granger-causality test, to 
determine the direction of information spillage. 
  
To detect the efficiency of market regulations and discipline on the overall market, an event study was 
conducted in Chapter 2 using data from 1997-2000. After ruling out the other four possibilities like: 
inefficient market, not material news announcements, small sample size and full anticipation by the 
market, it was determined information spillage did exist. Afterwards, a granger-causality test was 
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conducted to determine the direction of information spillage: the information was leaking from A shares 
to B shares. This suggests the overall market lacks the necessary discipline to prevent one type of 
shareholders (shareholders of A shares) from having earlier access to information than another type of 
shareholders (shareholders of B shares). The fact that A shares are shares denominated in local currency 
RMB yuan and mostly traded by native Chinese shareholders might not be a mere coincidence. After all, 
these shareholders enjoy the advantage of being close to the grapevine for privy information that may not 
be available to those who are playing on a guest field. It follows naturally that regulations aiming to 
improve professionalism of those who have access to privy information should be formulated and 
effectively enforced. Such regulations should target stakeholders and their affiliates: company directors, 
management, employees, customers, suppliers, professional service providers such as their lawyers, 
consultants, accountants etc. This would help to build a more equitable and fair market for all investors, 
boost people‘s confidence in the stock market and encourage more investment. This is pivotal to the 
healthy development of the Chinese stock market in the long run. 
 
Further study could be focused on latest status of similar studies on Chinese stock market. After all, this is 
still an emerging market, actively and constantly undergoing (sometimes quite dramatic) improvement 
and changes in terms of its policies and regulations. For instance, a new series of regulations have been 
introduced recently, such as the first draft of official insider trading regulations introduced in 2007 by 
China Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC) and updated at the end of 2012. With clearly defined 
professional boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviours regarding information communication, 
information is supposed to be contained well within. For following up study, it would be interesting to see 
the actual effects of these newly introduced policies and regulations , whether it helps to eliminate the 
difference between A shares and B shares. The second empirical study was conducted to test the 
relationship between capital structure and agency costs. The modern corporate imposed a dilemma for 
investors and stakeholders in general: the development of modern corporations requires the expertise and 
knowledge of professional managers who are not necessarily the owners of corporation. Therefore, 
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professional managers as the agents have fiduciary duty to the real owners of the firm, the principal, who 
entrust them to run the day to day operation and make relevant decisions regarding the corporation. 
Conflict of interests arises when these two parities‘ interests are not perfectly aligned: managers want 
higher payment and more perks out of the job, the owners want to maximize their own wealth, part of 
which might come from a motivating enough yet merely reasonable payment to the managers. Capital 
structure theories come in handy to expla in what would be the optimal structural arrangement in terms of 
debt and equity proportion. Since there are different opinions regarding this issue, it is best settled by 
conducting empirical study. 
   
The relationship between capital structure and agency costs was studied in Chapter 3, using data from 
1999 -2001. In order to get a more comprehensive picture, two different types of measurement for agency 
costs are used: assets turnover ratio and return on equity ratio (ROE). For the assets turnover ratio, only 
one equation was used; while a simultaneous equation was used for ROE measured agency costs due to 
the endogenous nature of ROE and gearing ratio. The empirical results from both the assets turnover ratio 
measured agency costs and the ROE measured agency costs showed strong evidence, significant at 1%, 
that higher gearing ratio helps to boost firm performance and reduce agency costs. 
 
However, the two measurements showed different results regarding the big owners‘ role in company 
performance. When measured by assets turnover ratio, the empirical results show that the concentration 
level of listed companies big shareholders don‘t seem to add value to firm through reduced agency costs, 
indicating the big owners weren‘t interested or capable in improving companies‘ operational efficiency. 
On the other hand, agency costs measured by ROE demonstrated significantly positive relationship 
between big shareholder and firm performance, so we can‘t come to a categorical conclusion that big 
shareholders always help to improve firm performance. In fact, the negative relationship between big 
shareholder and their preference to finance through equity rather than the relatively low cost debt, 
suggests they could be demonstrating value-damaging behaviour. This shows a conflict of interest 
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between large shareholder and minority shareholder. This empirical study has provided new evidence 
supporting debt‘s favourable role in firm performance, questioning the operational efficiency of big 
shareholders and detected the conflict of interests between big and minority shareholders, another form of 
agency issue. This is not dissimilar to the East European countries‘ privatization process, during which 
time the agent-agent issue rather than the agent-principal conflict presented a more prominent problem 
(Lipton & Sachs; Miller 2005). This appears to be quite common for economy undergoing 
transformational changes in the process of changing from state owned enterprises to private firms. This is 
a distinctive feature that set Chinese stock market apart from more mature and developed markets. It 
confirms the finding in the first empirical study about the fledgling and formative nature of Chinese stock 
market.  
 
Ever since the establishment of Chinese stock market in the 1990s, it has gone through many changes. 
One of the most prominent changes would be the 2005-2006 reform of ownership structure. It 
fundamentally changed the constitution of Chinese stock market listed firms‘ ownership: the previously 
non-circulating shares, about 2/3 of the total shares, gradually changed to circulating shares. This was 
meant to inject new energy to the then stagnant stock market: an overly tight grip by the state made it 
impossible for the stock market to function normally under market rules. This is just too important an 
event to be missed out in terms of Chinese stock market and corporate governance. This study will be the 
first and most comprehensive study regarding this stupendous change. 
 
In Chapter 4, the latest 2005-2006 Chinese stock market ownership reform was studied, using very 
comprehensive data from 2004-2006, including an original sample of all the listed firm finished reform by 
end of 2006, accounting for about 97.86% and 96.76% of the total market value of Shanghai (SSE) and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) respectively. The first part of chapter includes a detailed depiction of 
the ownership reform: though the 2/3 previously non-circulating shares are now fully circulatory in theory, 
and the overall Chinese listed firms demonstrated a trend of being more and more widely held than before, 
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the fundamental feature of tight state control remained largely intact. Further follow up study in several 
years (when the shares have an opportunity to change hand in trading) would be necessary to fully capture 
the impact of this reform. This is the first empirical study providing such a comprehensive and thorough 
study of the reform, fill in a gap in this area. It then included an empirical study using the post-reform 
data and ultimate ownership concept to test the impact of ultimate owners and separated ownership on 
company value. The results show increased level of ultimate owners‘ ownership has a positive 
relationship with company performance while separated ownership and control reduces company value. 
This is the first empirical study using ultimate ownership concept for such study in China.  
 
It is not difficult to understand the positive correlation between increased state ownership concentration 
level and performance. Higher state ownership concentration level indicates close relationship between 
the company and government, which would more than likely provide preferential and favourable 
treatment or support, such access to rare natural resources, bank loans or even monopoly.  
 
The separation level‘s negative relationship with firm performance needs more probing. According to 
Fama & Jensen (1983), for small closed firms, agency costs would be reduced by stipulating in the 
contract to have residual claimant as the decision controller and decision manager; they would be 
motivated by self-interest to make the best decisions and faithfully execute them. On the other hand, for 
large institutions, it‘s necessary to have separated ownership and control due to more expertise knowledge 
required at different levels of management. Fama & Jensen listed decision control mechanisms: stock 
market, market for takeovers, expert boards. However, there are prerequisites for any of these to work.  
For the stock market to fully function and display its specialty in ‗pricing common stocks and transfer 
them at low costs‘, it is essential to have all shares freely transferrable and traded – a clear handicap for 
the Chinese stock market. With over 2/3 of the shares controlled by the state, the fledgling Chinese stock 
market has got its wings clipped and can‘t reach its full potential. By the same line of reasoning, the 
market of takeover is practically non-existent: no-one can possibly make any manoeuvre a takeover with 
93 
 
only 1/3 of circulating shares. Finally, the expert boards can only work as an efficient device if ‗it limits 
the decision discretion of individual top managers‘. With state appointed officials as top managers, this 
would be very hard to pan out in reality.  
 
Like the two previous studies, the third empirical study also captured Chinese stock market during its 
formative and transformational stage. At this stage, more significant measures were taken to reduce the 
control and influence of the state in the stock market, by allowing full circulation of all shares and letting 
the invisible hands of market have more power. 
 
These three empirical studies have all focused on the market discipline and corporate governance issues 
in Chinese context. . It suggests the following results: 
 
(1). First and foremost, the studies point to one prominent feature of Chinese stock market: it is still an 
emerging market, undergoing its formative stages and improvement in various aspects. This has been 
reflected in the empirical study of information spillage between two markets. Due to lack of sufficient and 
enforceable laws and regulations, a feature going side by side with the early development stage of 
Chinese stock market, selective investors appear to have access to information not available to other 
investors.  
 
(2). Secondly, Chinese stock market has an overwhelmingly strong state presence and control. The first 
part of Chapter 4 drives this point home in unequivocal terms: for the over 70% of listed companies with 
ultimate owners, over 90% of the owners of absolute controllers are the state and over 70% of the 
comparative owners are also the state. Even after the reform, though there are signs of loosening state 
control, it pretty much remained status quo in essence. Combining this with the capital structure study in 
Chapter 3, it provided a refreshingly new perspective as to why, rather unorthodoxly, Chinese listed firms 
with higher gearing ratio would show positive relationship with performance. 
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(3). Thirdly, evidence suggests Chinese listed firms displayed features shared by other previously owned 
state firms in the process of privatization, the agent-agent issue.   
   
(4). The relationship between the ultimate shareholder‘s concentration level and performance is 
significantly positive, indicating ultimate owners would be more motivated to improve company 
performance when their holding in the company increases. When analysed with ultimate ownership, the 
results supports Tian & Estrin‘s result about positive relationship between higher concentration level and 
firm performance, especially when combined with results from the detailed ownership structure analysis: 
state ownership is not only very prevalent but also highly concentrated. 
 
On the other hand, the bigger the difference between an ultimate owner‘s actual ownership and its control, 
the less motivated the ultimate owners are in improve company performance.  This seemingly contradicts 
with Fama & Jensen‘s proposition that for large complex organizations, separated ownership would 
benefit from increase focus of expertise and knowledge, as proved by La Porta et al (2009): their study 
suggests ownership and control can be separated to the benefits of large shareholders. Though it does 
support Claessen‘s finding (2000) that due to weak legal system and protection of investors in emerging 
market, separated ownership and control exacerbates agency problem and damage firm value. This 
reconfirms Chinese stock market‘s feature as an emerging market. 
 
From the above studies, the following conclusions and proposals can be made regarding corporate 
governance of Chinese listed firms and Chinese stock market 
 
The lack of efficiency of market discipline (as tested in Chapter 2) on Chinese stock markets suggests 
more systemic changes are required for improvement.  
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(1). Strengthen market discipline. Chapter 2 showed a lack of efficient market discipline in prevent 
information spillage from one type of share to another, this requires the government put more effort in 
introducing more stringent and efficient mechanism and policy in the market to prevent this from 
happening again. This should both include introduction of new regulations as well as efficient 
enforcement measures, such as detection mechanisms and punitive measures.   
 
(2). To mitigate the agency problem as detected in Chapter 3, especially the lack of motivation from the 
big shareholders such the state and managers appointed by the state, establish managerial labour market 
might be an option. Instead of directly appointing managers by the state, managers can be hired through 
the managerial labour market based on the performances of companies they manage. Managers‘ income 
should be linked with the company performance instead of a fixed payment or being treated as an 
administrative system. Given that the state owned or controlled companies are the majorit ies among 
Chinese listed companies (see Chapter 4), managerial labour market would provide a good incentive to 
align managers‘ interest with the firms and improve corporate governance efficiency. 
 
(3). Increase managerial shareholding. Managerial shareholding of Chinese listed firms is extremely low, 
at below 1%.  Increasing the managerial shareholding would help to align the interest of the managers 
with that of the owners, thus would be an efficient way of reducing agency costs and improve corporate 
governance. 
 
Overall, the empirical studies show the Chinese stock market is an emerging market transformed from 
previously state-owned enterprises, still with prominent state control and influence. Naturally it displayed 
characteristics quite different from the ‗normal‘ western markets: such as lack of fully developed rules 
and regulations, agent-agent problem rather than the usual agent-principal problems, separated ownership 
and control actually don‘t fare well in this system, and most important of all the still prominent and 
prevalent state ownership even after the latest ownership reform. That‘s what made further study of 
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Chinese market necessary, tried and tested theories for developed and mature markets might not 
necessarily hold true here. There is still a long way to go to make it a market-oriented market, though 
there are signs of loosening state control. It goes without saying, it would be interesting to do further 
following up research to ascertain the exact extent of ownership changes after the 2005-2006 reform, after 
this empirical study provided a full-scale detailed report. 
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